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THE CFTC AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS: PURPOSEFUL
AMBIGUITY AND JURISDICTIONAL REACH
ALTON B. HARRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CIFTC's JURISDICTIONAL HOT SEAT
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") has en-
countered more than the usual amount of public criticism for a federal
regulatory agency in connection with its consent orders against BT
Securities Corporation ("BT")' and MG Refining and Marketing, Inc.
("MGRM"). 2 The CFTC has been accused of "egregious overreach-
ing,"' 3 unjustified "micromanagement of business," 4 "legislating
through enforcement actions," 5 and having "undone standing regula-
tory policy ' 6 in entering these orders.
I want to explore the bases and validity of these criticisms. Spe-
cifically, I plan to examine in depth both the BT Order and the
MGRM Order-to provide, as it were, a more-than-you-wanted-to-
know-and-never-thought-about-asking account of those Orders-and
then to use that account as a basis for arguing that those orders, and
other recent CFTC actions, can be fairly characterized as purposeful
attempts by the CFTC to extend its jurisdictional reach by means of
intentionally ambiguous jurisdictional claims.
In the following discussion, I am highly critical of the CFTC, par-
ticularly of its intellectual honesty. I am not, however, critical of its
good intentions. The CFTC enjoys neither the strategically placed
alumni and solid tradition of regulatory independence that the Securi-
* Partner, Ungaretti & Harris, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law and Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am grateful to Jennifer Zordani for
her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. In re BT Securities Corp., CFTC No. 95-3, CFTC Admin. Rep. (Wash. Serv. Bureau)
No. 95030 (Dec. 22, 1994) [hereinafter BT Order].
2. In re MG Ref. and Mktg., Inc., CFTC No. 95-14, CFTC Admin. Rep. (Wash. Serv.
Bureau) No. 95155 (July 27, 1995) [hereinafter MGRM Order].
3. Merton H. Miller & Christopher L. Culp, Rein in the CFTC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995,
at A10.
4. Joanne Morrison, Former CFTC Head: Governments are Overreacting to Derivative Fu-
ror, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 1, 1995, at 5 (quoting Wendy Gramm, former CFTC Chairperson).
5. Rob Wells, Derivative Dealers Criticize Government Regulators, AP, Feb. 22, 1995,
available in Westlaw, ASSOCPR database (quoting Richard Breeden, former SEC
Chairperson).
6. William J. Hanley & James T. Moser, The Policy Implications of the Bankers Trust Set-
tlement, DERIVATIVES Q., Spring 1995, at 25.
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ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") does, nor does it have the
unchallengeable power of the Federal Reserve Board. It is a rela-
tively new agency, tiny by federal standards, something of a legislative
plaything, and more than a little beholden to those it regulates for its
appropriations and jurisdictional mandate. More than that, it has
been asked to administer our most poorly drafted federal regulatory
statute and to use this statute to regulate our most dynamic financial
markets-the over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives markets. Perhaps
it is the CFTC's efforts, however modest, to give precise definition to
its jurisdictional mandate that are extraordinary, and its (of late) more
frequent resort to indirection, ambiguity, and silence as to its jurisdic-
tional bases that should be expected.
That said, the first point that I hope will emerge from what fol-
lows is that, in the area of OTC derivative products, the CFTC has
been unwilling or unable to define the scope of its own jurisdiction.
The most common criticism has been that the CFTC has engaged in
an "unjustified assertion" of jurisdiction.7 While undoubtedly correct
in most circumstances, this criticism also misses the essential problem.
The CFTC administers a statute that has such an open-ended reach
that the agency could (seek to) rule the financial world if it were so
minded. The problem is not that the CFTC aggressively uses the
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") 8 systematically to enlarge its turf,
but that it appears to possess neither the intellectual nor institutional
commitment to regulatory consistency to feel obligated to mark its
own jurisdictional boundaries-whether aggressively or modestly
drawn-with any clarity. The not surprising result is pervasive uncer-
tainty in the financial markets as to the regulatory status of a wide
variety of OTC products.
But there is a second point that I will try to make, and that is that
the CFTC's difficulties in administering the CEA are in significant
part the result of a fundamental conflict between what have been pre-
sumed to be the regulatory presuppositions of that statute and the
economic realities of modern financial markets. Under what have
been called the "classic" 9 elements of futures contracts, any contract
used to shift risk without also involving an intent to deliver or receive
7. See Morrison, supra note 4.
8. Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994).
9. In re Stovall [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,775
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) (identifying the "classic elements" of futures contracts as being: (1) offered
to the public; (2) secured by margin; (3) standardized as to terms; and (4) closed by offset). See
discussion infra pp. 106-08.
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commodities is a "futures" contract, period. This means that if the
classic elements are the correct elements for identifying contracts sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC, all risk shifting products 10 can
legally exist only within an exchange trading environment, absent an
applicable exemption. Apart from the unlikelihood that this would be
a sensible or desirable regulatory result, is it the correct legal result?
Some, most particularly the futures exchanges, argue "yes,"
pointing to the legislative history of the CEA and the judicial prece-
dents confirming the classic elements." Others, most particularly the
derivatives industry, argue "no," pointing to the need for the CEA's
jurisdictional standards to evolve as new forms of commercial and in-
stitutional transactions are developed. 12 In the midst of this debate,
the CFTC often appears to be a mere mediator, seeking to reconcile
the conflicting positions, but always careful to be sufficiently ambigu-
ous in expressing its own views so as to not overly offend one side or
the other.
In what follows, I first set out the statutory setting that gives rise
to these fundamentally conflicting jurisdictional perspectives and pro-
vide some sense of how they have evolved. Then I examine the
CFTC's BT Order and MGRM Order in an effort to illustrate both
the CFTC's timidity in dealing with questions of the scope of its own
jurisdiction and the costs of that timidity in terms of regulatory uncer-
tainty. Finally, I offer a modest recommendation for ending the
CFTC's current jurisdictional dilemma by suggesting that the tradi-
tional requirement for the identification of a forward contract-that
the parties to it intend that it will be satisfied by delivery-is mistaken
and needs to be replaced.
10. Options are a special case discussed infra note 135.
11. See Letter from John H. Stassen & Mark D. Young, Kirkland & Ellis, to The Honorable
Richard G. Lugar, Chairperson, Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry (Aug. 18, 1995)
(on file with author).
12. See Letter from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association to Jean Webb,
Secretary of the CFTC (Dec. 13, 1994) (responding to the CFTC's request for comment regard-
ing possible Amendment of CFTC Rule 35) (on file with author); see also Michael Ocrant, In-
dustry Still Looking to Congress to Settle Questions Raised by Last Year's MG Settlement with
CFTC, SEC. WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 5.
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II. THE FORWARD CONTRACT EXCLUSION
A. Statutory Framework
The CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over "transac-
tions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.' 3
The CFTC is thus vested with exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over
so-called "futures contracts." Until the passage of the Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992,14 which authorized the CFTC to exempt trans-
actions from the CEA, the CEA required that all transactions in fu-
tures contracts occur only on, or subject to the rules of, boards of
trades that have been designated by the CFTC as "contract markets,"
that is, "commodity exchanges."'15
The key exclusion from the CFTC's jurisdiction over future con-
tracts is the so-called "forward contract exclusion." The CEA states,
without further elaboration, that futures contracts do not include "any
sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery, ' 16 that
is, futures contracts do not include "forward contracts." Whether a
contract that calls for delivery of a commodity in the future is a fu-
tures contract or a forward contract has great significance, for futures
contracts established off of a commodity exchange are illegal in the
absence of an otherwise available exemption.' 7
The effort to draw a workable, if not precise, distinction between
futures and forward contracts has engaged the CFTC and the courts
for more than twenty years. The history of this effort is an often told
tale, which I do not propose to retell. What I do propose to do, how-
ever, is to trace briefly the development of the concepts of "delivery"
and "offset" as the key elements used to differentiate forward con-
tracts from futures contracts; to make what should be the obvious
13. C.E.A. § la(3), 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1994). This section of the CEA defines "commodities"
to include enumerated physical commodities; other goods and articles; and all services, rights,
and interests "in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." Id.
A transaction may be recognizable as a futures contract even though the underlying commodity
is not presently being traded as a futures contract on a CFTC-designated contract market. See,
H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 76 (1974) (statement of the then-Assistant Secretary of Agriculture,
Dr. Clayton Yeutter).
14. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
15. C.E.A. § 6(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6(a). The recent amendments to the CEA authorize the
CFTC to "exempt any agreement, contract, or transaction (or class thereof) that is otherwise
subject to subsection (a) of this section, . . . either unconditionally or on stated terms or condi-
tions or for stated periods and either retroactively or prospectively, or both, from ... any other
provision of this chapter (except section 2(a)(1)(B)) .... C.E.A. § 4c(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6c(1).
16. C.E.A. § la(11), 7 U.S.C. § la(11).
17. Off-exchange transactions in non-exempt futures contracts are prosecutable as felonies
punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine of up to one million dollars. See C.E.A.
§ 9(a), 7 U.S.C. § 13(a).
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point that if these elements are decisive in differentiating forwards
from futures, the conflict between the CFTC's regulation of the fu-
tures markets and the growth and vitality of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket is inevitable and unreconcilable; and finally to introduce the
discussion of the BT and MGRM Orders with the observation that the
CFTC's attempt to resolve this conflict by tinkering with the concepts
of "delivery" and "offset" is the cause of its reliance on purposeful
ambiguity.
B. Initial Attempts to Identify the Key Elements of Forward and
Futures Contracts
In its earliest considerations of the elements that distinguish fu-
tures contracts from forward contracts, the CFTC, or at least its Office
of General Counsel, developed two approaches, radically different
and fundamentally inconsistent. The first was spelled out in a 1977
Interpretative Letter ("1977 Interpretation") written to a firm operat-
ing as a "blind broker" 18 between primary dealers in Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (otherwise known as "GNMA") and
Treasury securities. 19
The Office of General Counsel sought to analyze whether the
proposed transactions in GNMAs and Treasuries were "transactions
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery within
the meaning of the Act."20 Its starting point was that the "plain mean-
ing [of the phrase 'contract of sale of a commodity for future deliv-
ery'] is clearly broad enough to encompass . . . contracts that are
commonly described as forward contracts."'21 The issue as the CFTC
saw it, therefore, was to identify the basis on which the Congress in-
tended futures contracts, which are to be fully regulated, to be distin-
guished from forward contracts.
The key distinction for the Office of General Counsel was that
futures contracts "are defined not only by the element of deferred
shipment [which is common to both futures and forwards contracts]
but also by the nature of the marketplace in which a buyer and seller
entered into the contract. ' 22 Thus, the thrust of the forward contract
18. A "blind broker" protects the identity of the dealers which are party to the transaction
by acting as the middleman between them.
19. See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12 (Dealers in GNMA Certificates as Board of
Trade), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,467, at 21,909, (Aug. 17,
1977) [hereinafter 1977 Interpretation].
20. Id. at 21,910.




exemption "is toward the marketplace in which the transaction occurs
rather than the element of deferred shipment. '23 This means that the
critical element in distinguishing futures from forwards is not whether
delivery is intended or offset is available but whether the contracts
under review "are traded by a group of persons whose activities [in-
cluding general public participation in the transactions] bring them
within the definition of a board of trade . . . [in the CEA].''24 If the
trading occurs on a board of trade, then the contracts are future con-
tracts; if not, then not.
I will argue at the conclusion of this paper that the approach to
the futures/forward distinction in the 1977 Interpretation is sensible
and, at least in part, offers a way out of the regulatory dilemma in
which the CFTC is currently entangled. For the time being, suffice it
to note that the vitality of the 1977 Interpretation was short lived; for
a little over a year later, the Office of the General Counsel, in a mem-
orandum to the CFrC ("1978 Memorandum"), 25 which did not refer
to the 1977 Interpretation or discuss looking to the "marketplace in
which the transaction occurs" 26 as a way to identify futures contracts,
concluded that all transactions involving contracts that call for future
delivery are futures contracts except for cash sale contracts contem-
plating actual, although deferred, delivery.27
Interestingly, the 1978 Memorandum starts at exactly the same
point as did the 1977 Interpretation: "Its plain and literal meaning [of
the phrase 'contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery'], how-
ever, encompasses any contract for the delivery of a specified com-
modity at a later date. Thus, the term may be read to include...
'forward' contracts that do not necessarily have all of the characteris-
tics of futures traded on designated exchanges. '28 But in attempting
to discern the Congressional intent as to how futures contracts were to
be distinguished from forward contracts, the 1978 Memorandum came
out at precisely the opposite place: the forward contract exclusion is
available "solely for the benefit of persons involved in a commercial
cash commodity business, which would allow them to effect cash sales
of the commodity, contemplating actual delivery as a matter of course,
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See Gen. Counsel. Mem. (Sept. 5, 1978), reprinted as amended in 44 Fed. Reg. 13,498
(Mar. 12, 1979) [hereinafter 1978 Memorandum].
26. 1977 Interpretation, supra note 19, at 21,911.
27. See 1978 Memorandum, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 13,498.
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but in which shipment or delivery of the commodity might be deferred
for purposes of commercial convenience or necessity. '29
Thus, in the view of the Office of General Counsel, as reflected in
the 1978 Memorandum, "all off-exchange offerings30 of commodities
for future delivery . . . are generally unlawful."'31 The only permissi-
ble off-exchange contracts calling for future delivery are in "the class
of commercially motivated cash commodity sales, which contemplate
actual delivery of the commodity, but in which delivery may be de-
ferred for purposes of commercial convenience or necessity. '32 Thus,
was born in 1978, the notion that the elements that distinguish for-
ward contracts from futures contracts are the "contemplat[ion] [of]
actual delivery"33 and the fact of delivery "in virtually all cases." 34 I
will refer to these elements collectively as the "Delivery
Requirement."
C. The "Classic Elements" of a Futures Contract
A year after the 1978 Memorandum, the CFTC decided its first
administrative proceeding involving the question of when an off-ex-
change offering of contracts for the purchase or sale of commodities
involves illegal off-exchange futures contracts. 35 Without citing the
1978 Memorandum, in In re Stovall, the CFTC held that the forward
contract exclusion
was intended to cover only contracts for sale which are entered into
with the expectation that delivery of the actual commodity will
eventually occur through performance on the contracts ...
Although the desire to acquire or dispose of a physical commodity
is the underlying motivation for entering such a contract, delivery
may be deferred for purposes of convenience or necessity.36
29. Id. For a view of the legislative history of the forward contract exclusion contrary to
that in the 1978 Memorandum and generally supportive of the 1977 Interpretation, see Letter
and Appendix A thereto, from Robert E. Rubin, Partner, Goldman Sachs & Co., to the Office of
the Secretariat, CFTC (May 10, 1988) (on file with author).
30. The notion of "offerings" in the 1978 Memorandum was derived from the concept of
entities "existing to conduct a business in the offer of contracts of sale of a commodity for future
delivery .. " which was illegal under then section 4h of the CEA. Undoubtedly, there is a
presumption that the offering will involve the general public although that subtlety in the 1978
Memorandum has been generally lost in the CFTC and judicial rulings that have followed it.
31. 1978 Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13,501.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 13,499.
35. See In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at
23,775, (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
36. Id. at 23,777-778.
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Consequently, while both futures and forward contracts entail "the
legal obligation to perform," the "major difference" between them is
"the generally fulfilled expectation that the [forward] contract will
lead to the exchange of commodities for money."'37
In In re Stovall, the CFTC went on to identify four additional
"classic elements" 38 of futures contracts: they are (1) offered to the
public; (2) secured by margin; (3) standardized as to terms; and (4)
closed by offset.39 But the CFTC cautioned that "all of these ele-
ments" need not be present to identify a futures contract nor are these
"classic elements" an "exhaustive catalogue" of relevant factors. 40
Rather, "each operation" must be examined "in context."' 41 Never-
theless, the CFTC left no doubt that the "lack of delivery is the clear-
est indication that the contracts [are] not [forward contracts]. 42
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided CFTC v. Co
Petro,43 which is unquestionably the leading case on the futures/for-
wards distinction. Relying heavily on Stovall, the Ninth Circuit held
that so-called "Agency Agreements for Purchase and Sale of Motor
Vehicle Fuel" marketed to the public by Co Petro were illegal off-
exchange futures contracts." Although discussing other elements of
futures contracts and acknowledging that "no bright-line definition or
list of characterizing elements [of such contracts] is determinative, 45
the court squarely held that the forward contract exclusion is "nar-
row" and not available to contracts "sold merely for speculative pur-
poses and which are not predicated upon the expectation that delivery
of the actual commodity by the seller to the original contracting buyer
will occur in the future."'46 The court noted that the ability to avoid
"delivery against the contracts" is accomplished through "offsetting or
liquidating transactions" that are made possible by "[s]tandardized
form contracts. '47 Thus, "essential" to a futures contract is the ability
to offset in order to avoid "the forced burden of delivery. '48 By con-
37. Id. at 23,778.
38. Id. at 23,777.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 23,779.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. See id. at 582.
45. Id. at 581.
46. Id. at 579.




trast, "a cash forward contract is one in which the parties contemplate
physical transfer of the actual commodity. '49
There is no point to be served by discussing the significant
number of cases that have reiterated and elaborated on the Stovall
and Co Petro decisions.50 The point I want to emphasize is that begin-
ning with the 1978 Memorandum, the CFTC, in identifying the for-
ward contracts that are to be excluded from regulation under the
CEA, almost always citing Co Petro, has focused ever more sharply on
whether delivery is intended and regularly occurs. Thus in 1985, the
CFTC's Office of the General Counsel identified illegal off-exchange
futures contracts as those that are "standardized as to terms and con-
ditions" and "undertaken primarily to assume or shift... risk... and
... not generally entered into for purposes of obtaining delivery of the
commodity, but rather are discharged through offsetting transac-
tions .... -"51 Later that same year, the CFTC summarized its position
by stating that "[i]n cash forward contracting the parties have the ca-
pacity to make or take delivery of the actual commodity, intend to do
so, and delivery in fact routinely occurs. '52 It certainly would not be
an exaggeration to characterize the CFTC's view at this time as being
that off-exchange transactions between parties that have as their pri-
mary purpose risk shifting and not product delivery are illegal futures
contracts.
D. The CFTC's Apparent Abandonment of the
Delivery Requirement
This pattern of CFTC interpretation of the forward contract ex-
clusion continued unbroken until 1987. 53 In December of that year,
the CFTC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Ad-
vance Notice"), 54 which contained a number of far reaching and con-
49. Id. at 578.
50. See e.g., In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991); Chicago Merch. Exch. v. S.E.C., 883
F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989); Transnor (Berm.) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); NRT Metals Inc. v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous) Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
51. The Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-Exchange Future Delivery
Type Instruments-Statutory Interpretation, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,656, 11,657 (CFTC 1985). The
other traditional elements of a futures contract were relegated to a footnote. See id. at 11,657
n.2.
52. Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery-Statutory Interpretation and Re-
quest for Comments, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983, 42,984 n.7 (CFTC 1985).
53. See, e.g., Bank Activities Involving the Sale of Precious Metals, [1984-86 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,854 (CFTC Gen. Couns. Aug. 6, 1985).
54. See Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022 (CFTC 1987)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34) (proposed Dec. 11, 1987).
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troversial proposals. With respect to the futures/forwards distinction,
the CFTC reiterated the traditional definition of a forward contract,
but then acknowledged the regulatory need to address two "new" cat-
egories of transactions: the first, commercial "transactions [for exam-
ple, in the Brent oil market] . . . that would constitute forward
contracts but for the lack of delivery as the normal culmination of the
transaction, ' '55 and, the second, commercial transactions, for example,
in the swap market, that "substantially depart from the context in
which the forward contract exclusion has historically operated. '56 In
light of both types of transactions, the CFTC requested comments on
a set of criteria to identify "categories of commercial commodity
transactions [as to which CFTC] jurisdiction is unwarranted and...
no-action relief is therefore appropriate. '57
What the CFTC was saying, or appeared to be saying, in the Ad-
vance Notice was really quite extraordinary. (1) "[Tlhe infrequency
of delivery" in certain active and well established categories of com-
mercial transactions, including at least the Brent oil market and the
swap market, "tend to preclude their characterization as forward con-
tracts within the [CEA's] jurisdictional exclusion .... 58 (2) Neverthe-
less, the regulation of these transactions as futures contracts is
"unwarranted. ' 59 (3) The CFTC was not, however, prepared to
"modify or affect" the scope of the forward contract exclusion so as to
clarify the legal status of these transactions.60 But (4), the CFTC was
prepared to consider no-action relief, which would in no way foreclose
or even weaken private suits alleging the illegality of these contracts.
The CFTC received more than eighty comment letters, totaling
over eight hundred pages, in response to the Advance Notice. The
responses were overwhelmingly critical. The OTC dealers were out-
raged that the CFTC had cast doubt on the legal status of their mar-
kets. The commodity exchanges were outraged that the CFTC was
moving to protect the OTC markets, rather than shut them down.
And the other federal financial regulators were outraged that the
CFTC appeared to be stepping on their turf.61
55. Id. at 47,026-27.
56. Id. at 47,027.
57. Id. at 47,023.
58. Id. at 47,027.
59. See id. at 47,024.
60. See id. at 47,027 n.16.
61. The Department of Treasury told the CFTC the Advance Notice would "seriously in-
hibit the efficient operation of financial markets." Letter from George D. Gould, Under Secre-
tary Finance, Dept. of Treasury, to Chairman Gramm, CFTC (Apr. 5, 1988) (on file with author).
The Treasury also claimed that the CFTC's proposed scheme generated "uncertainty among
[Vol. 71:1117
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The CFTC had begun to reap the fruits of its reliance on the De-
livery Requirement, for it had become apparent that if this require-
ment continued to be the touchstone of contracts excluded from the
CEA, CFTC regulation and the OTC institutional financial market
were on a clear collision course. The CFTC's no-action proposal
would be of no help in avoiding such a collision, and unless the CFTC
was prepared to modify the Delivery Requirement, a major cataclysm
appeared inevitable.62 Not surprisingly, therefore, the CFTC began to
back away from the Delivery Requirement.
market participants with respect to a wide variety of transactions," and could have "potentially
deleterious effects on financial markets generally as the uncertainty increases." Id.
The Office of Comptroller of the Currency also disapproved. It saw the issue as a presump-
tuous assertion of CFTC jurisdiction "not only over new bank products, but also over traditional
banking products." Letter from J. Michael Sheperd, Comptroller of the Currency, to Chairman
Gramm, CFTC (Apr. 11, 1988) (on file with author). The Comptroller informed the CFTC that
its proposal "amounts to an unnecessary interference with banking activities and their regulation
by the office of the Comptroller of the Currency." Id.
The SEC asserted that the Advance Notice had "an apparent chilling effect on new product
development," and that the adoption of the rules would "further retard capital market innova-
tion exemplified by the development of hybrid instruments." Letter from Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC (Aug. 19,
1988) (on file with author). The SEC also called the CFTC to task for an unjustified attempt to
expand its jurisdiction. See id. The CEA, according to the SEC, does not provide the CFTC
with "the legal authority" or "the regulatory flexibility" to regulate the issuance and secondary-
market trading of hybrid instruments issued in bona fide financing transactions. See id. Appro-
priate regulation is provided by federal securities laws, which "provide a flexible regulatory
scheme that ... govern[s] effectively the evolving market for such instruments." Id.
62. Among the comments on the CFTC's proposal were three full-scale analyses of Con-
gress's "intent" with respect to the CFTC's regulation of off-exchange products. One analysis
was by friends of the CFTC's proposal, two were by critics. But each had a unique perspective,
and each reached a different conclusion.
The friendly history consisted of an article written by two lawyers representing the Chicago
Board of Trade. For them, the distinction between futures contracts and forward contracts is
clear and unambiguous. Futures include all executory contracts requiring delivery some time
after they are entered into. The sole exception is for forwards-future-settling contracts-entered
into with an "intent to deliver" the commodity. This history concludes that the CEA prohibits
trading future-settling contracts away from an exchange unless there is intent to deliver the sub-
ject of the contract. In this view, "Congress intended to excuse from the otherwise plenary reach
of the exchange-trading requirement only a very narrow class of futures-settling contracts that
contemplate the transfer of actual ownership of a commodity in a commercial, merchandising
transaction." Alton B. Harris et at., Hybrid Products: The Band Plays On, INTERMARKET, Nov.
1988.
An interpretation more in tune with financial realities was submitted by the New York
Clearing House. It finds that from the beginning of federal regulation of the futures markets,
"Congress has recognized the legitimacy of various forms of off-exchange transactions which
may resemble exchange contracts in certain respects." Letter from John F. Lee, Executive Vice
President, New York Clearing House, to Office of the Secretariat, CFTC (Apr. 8, 1988) Appen-
dix A (on file with author). Congress is determined to exempt such transactions from regulation,
"rather than attempt to force them to be entered into on the exchange floors or impose other
burdensome requirements." Id. Congress recognized that because of the expansive definition of
"commodity" added to the CEA in 1974, "the possibility arose that the [CFTC's] jurisdiction
would be interpreted to apply to trading in foreign currencies and other financial instruments
conducted off the organized commodity exchanges." Id. So Congress added the so-called
"Treasury Amendment" to the CEA, which excluded from the statute's coverage "transactions
19961
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The first step in this retreat was the CFTC's issuance of its Policy
Statement Concerning Swap Transactions ("Swaps Policy State-
ment").63 This statement reads in places as a CFTC no-action posi-
tion,64 and in other places as a statutory interpretation. 65 Whichever
way the statement is read, however, it contains a significant new slant
on the characteristics that distinguish forward contracts from futures
contracts.
In the Swaps Policy Statement, the CFTC appears to acknowl-
edge that, despite various distinctions between the trading of swaps
and exchange-traded futures, "the economic reality of swaps never-
theless resembles that of futures contracts. ' 66 The CFTC also argues,
however, that swaps generally have characteristics "that may warrant
in foreign currency [and six other specified instruments], unless such transactions involve the sale
thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." Harris et al., supra.
The Clearing House recognizes that because of market developments since 1974, "not all
[off-exchange] financial products that have subsequently become widely offered may fit precisely
within the explicit terms of the Treasury Amendment." Id. But if the products don't fit and
aren't within the forward-contract exclusion because delivery is not intended, what exempts
them from exchange trading requirements? The Clearing House argues "that had there been
full awareness of such products ... the Treasury Amendment or some other provision would
have excluded such products explicitly." Id.
The most thoughtful analysis of legislative history came from Goldman, Sachs & Co. See
Letter from Robert E. Rubin, Partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co., to the Office of the Secretariat,
CFTC (May 10, 1988) (on file with author). "'The critical distinction drawn in the statute,"
Goldman contends, is "not between exchange and off-exchange trading, but between 'legitimate'
commercial trading and 'gambling'." Id. at A-1. As Goldman interprets the legislative history,
the only off-exchange activity intended to be prohibited is the operation of bucket shops. See id.
at A-17. This was accomplished through the exclusion of forward contracts, which "was in-
tended ... to encompass all permissible off-exchange trading." Id. at A-16. Contrary to other
readings, Goldman does not think the availability of the exclusion turns on an "intent to deliver"
but "on the nature of the parties at the time of contract." Id. Delivery is not critical because
Congress understood that "settlement by offset, in a commercial context, is the legal equivalent
of physical delivery." Id. at A-11. Goldman claims that Congress intended the forward-contract
exclusion "to serve as a commercial exception covering a broad range of off-exchange transac-
tions entered into for legitimate business purposes." Id. at A-26. As a result, it "did not limit its
scope to those [transactions] resulting in delivery." Id.
Goldman's analysis has one major flaw. If the forward-contract exclusion was to be inter-
preted that broadly, why was the Treasury Amendment needed in 1974? Despite the use critics
have made of the Treasury Amendment, its presence in the CEA is the strongest argument for
the CFTC's position. Either Goldman is right and the Treasury Amendment is superfluous-a
hard conclusion for the CFFC or a court to reach-or Goldman is wrong and the Treasury
Amendment is necessary. If the latter is true, then products not specifically covered by the
Amendment are subject to CFTC regulation. This is also a hard conclusion for a court and the
CFTC to reach, given the major disruption it would cause.
63. See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (CFTC 1989)
[hereinafter Swaps Policy Statement].
64. "[T]he Commission has determined that a greater degree of clarity may be achieved
through safe harbor guidelines establishing specific criteria for swap transactions to which the
Commission's regulatory framework will not be applied." Id. at 30,696.
65. "[T]he Commission is issuing this policy statement to clarify its view of the regulatory
status of certain swap transactions." Id. at 30,694.
66. Id. at 30,695.
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distinguishing them from futures contracts. ' 67 Therefore, the CFTC
set out characteristics that constitute "safe harbor standards" by iden-
tifying "swaps for which regulation under the CEA . . . is
unnecessary." 68
One of the CFTC's safe harbor standards is the "absence of ex-
change-style offset. ' 69 By exchange-style offset, the CFIC means the
ability to terminate or liquidate a contract by taking "an equal and
opposite position" without the "[p]rior consent of the
counterparty. ' 70 In contrast to "exchange-style offset" is the ability to
terminate a contractual obligation "only with counterparty consent"
that is "privately negotiated" either before or after the "outset of the
agreement. 71 In the CFTC's view, swaps that do not have exchange-
style offset may be excluded from regulation under the CEA "consis-
tent with policies reflected in the CEA's jurisdictional exclusion for
forward contracts ....
Two points are noteworthy about the CFTC's reliance on the ab-
sence of exchange-style offset as a distinguishing feature of forward
contracts. First, in characterizing the nature of forward contracts as
they "generally have been recognized," 73 the CFTC does not mention
the Delivery Requirement, that is, the parties' intent to effect delivery
and delivery, in fact, routinely occurring.74 Of course, swaps do not
generally call for delivery under any circumstances, but by acknowl-
edging that nondelivery contracts can be forward contracts and by
shifting the emphasis as to the distinguishing elements of forward con-
tracts away from intent75 and actual performance, the CFTC set the
stage for further retreat from the Delivery Requirement. Second, the
67. Id. Why "may" warrant? This is a trivial example of the CFTC's studied ambiguity.
68. Id. According to the Swaps Policy Statement, exempted swaps must have individually-
tailored terms, lack the ability to terminate by exchange-style offset, be based upon individual-
ized credit determinations, be undertaken in conjunction with a line of business, and not be
marketed to the public. Id. at 30,696-697.
69. Id. at 30,696.
70. "In the context of exchange-traded futures, offset refers to the liquidation of a futures
position through the acquisition of an opposite position. The availability of such offset, resulting
in the liquidation of the position, typically is established by exchange rules governing exchange
members' relationships with the clearing house." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30,695.
73. Id.
74. "Sales of cash commodities for deferred delivery, or forward contracts, generally have
been recognized to be commercial ... counterparties who have the capacity to make or take
delivery of the underlying commodity but in which delivery 'may be deferred for purposes of
convenience or necessity."' Id. (citing In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,777-78 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979)).
75. The CFFC does limit the availability of this safe harbor characteristic to "instruments
... that are entered into with the expectation of performance." Id. at 30,696. But without any
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notion that forward contracts are characterized by the absence of "ex-
change-style offset" is a puzzling notion since neither Stovall nor Co
Petro were characterized by a right of offset in this sense. In these
cases, and in almost all other cases finding illegal off-exchange futures
contracts, offset was accomplished by the accommodation or tacit un-
derstanding of the counterparty, not by there being any sort of right to
offset without the "consent" of the counterparty.
After the Swaps Policy Statement, the CFTC's final step in its
apparent retreat from the Delivery Requirement appears, in hind-
sight, to have been inevitable. In the Advance Notice, the CFTC
noted that one court had "preliminarily expressed the view that [15-
day] Brent oil transactions are predominantly futures transactions. '76
In early 1990, that federal district court definitively ruled in Transnor
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North American Petroleum that "15-day Brent
transactions constitute futures contracts.' 77 In the view of that court,
15-day Brent contracts are "a novel type of transaction, which appears
to be a hybrid of a futures contract and a forward contract. ' 78 In par-
ticular, "[b]ecause the contracts do not provide for offset without the
consent of the parties and because the seller cannot predict in advance
whether a particular buyer will insist on physical delivery, the market
remains one based on physical trading. '79 Yet, the "three major moti-
vations in Brent market activity [are] hedging, speculation and tax
spinning. ... "80 And over ninety-five percent of 15-day Brent con-
tracts are "routinely settled by means other than delivery, most typi-
cally through clearing techniques of offset and bookout."81
Under these circumstances, the court concluded "the 15-day
Brent market does not remotely resemble the commercial trading
requirement that swaps, in fact, will generally be "held to maturity," it is hard to understand
what this "expectation" means.
76. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022, 47,027 n.19 (CFTC
1987) (alteration in original), codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34 (July 21, 1989)).
77. Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petrol., 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1493 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
78. Id. at 1489. 15-day Brent contracts are negotiated in the Brent market. The Brent mar-
ket is comprised of the chain of producers and commercial entities and others who use oil from
the North Sea fields. The participants contract to buy and sell cargoes of Brent oil. (A cargo of
Brent system crude oil is approximately 500,000 barrels, and depending on the market price, a
single contract has a value in the millions of dollars.) Title to the cargo passes to each participant
in the chain and each participant is responsible for its performance, although the participants
may also terminate their contracts through individually negotiated cancellation agreements.
79. Id. at 1490 (citing The Legal Aspects of the 15-Day Brent Market (Part 1), 5 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 109, 116 (1987)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1491.
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originally excepted from the [CEA], ' 82 for the "high levels of specula-
tion and performance without delivery . . . distinguish the 15-day
Brent transactions from the forward contracts contemplated by the
drafters of the [CEA]. ' 83 The court, therefore, held that the transac-
tions in 15-day Brent contracts were illegal off-exchange futures con-
tracts despite the fact that the contracts did not provide for offset
without the consent of the parties.84 In the court's view, "even where
there is no 'right' of offset, the 'opportunity' to offset and a tacit ex-
pectation and common practice of offsetting suffices to deem the
transaction a futures contract. '8 5
The Transnor decision squarely posed for the CFTC an acute reg-
ulatory dilemma. It could either accept the decision and its implica-
tions-namely, to regulate or prohibit the entire Brent market-or
reject the Delivery Requirement and permit the Brent market to con-
tinue to operate. Not surprisingly, the CFTC chose the latter course.
Five months after the Transnor decision was handed down, the CFTC
issued its Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions 86
("1990 Interpretation"), effectively stating that the Transnor court had
misunderstood the legal characteristics of forward contracts.
The 1990 Interpretation appears to eliminate entirely the tradi-
tional, critical focus on (1) the intent of the parties to make and take
delivery and (2) the actual occurrence of delivery on a regular basis.
Instead, the CFTC stated that the forward contract exclusion would
be satisfied if transactions entered into between commercial partici-
pants in connection with their businesses created specific delivery ob-
ligations that impose on the participants substantial economic risks of
a commercial nature.87 Directly contradicting the Transnor court, the
CFTC effectively held that it is the contractual right to offset the
transaction or, more accurately, the absence of such a contractual
right "by the terms of the contracts as initially entered into," that is
controlling.88 As long as the parties must negotiate separate agree-
ments relieving them of their delivery obligations and thus "cannot
discharge [their] obligations through exchange-style offset,"8 9 that is,
82. Id. at 1492 (alteration in original).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1492.
85. Id.
86. Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188 (CFTC
1990) [hereinafter 1990 Interpretation].
87. See id. at 39,191.
88. Id. at 39,192.
89. Id. at 39,191.
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they have no "right of offset," it is no longer relevant that the parties
enter such transactions for the purpose of hedging, speculating, and
tax spinning, and with the "tacit expectation" that delivery will not
occur.
The CFTC explained the change in its previous position by stat-
ing that the "concept of what constitutes delivery" in the context of
the forward contract exclusion must be reinterpreted to reflect the re-
alities of "today's commercial environment. '" 90 The CFTC effectively
conceded that notwithstanding the long history of CFTC and judicial
interpretations of the forward contract exclusion, "a diverse variety of
transactions" between commercial counterparties evolved that was
beyond the established definition of forward contracts. 91 These trans-
actions "serve the same commercial functions" as the forward con-
tracts that were originally subject to the forward contract exclusion,
but differ in that the transactions "may ultimately result in perform-
ance through the payment of cash as an alternative to actual physical
transfer or delivery of the commodity. '92
The CFTC carefully avoided saying it was reversing its position
on the necessity of meeting the Delivery Requirement in order for a
contract to come within the forward contract exclusion. Nonetheless,
the upshot of the CFTC's 1990 Interpretation appeared to be that it
would no longer assess the "underlying purpose" of the parties to a
purported forward contract, particularly with respect to whether deliv-
ery of the underlying commodity is in fact intended by the parties, as
long as the formal contractual indicia of a forward contract can be
satisfied. The CFTC's rejection of the Delivery Requirement as the
critical element in identifying forward contracts appeared to be con-
firmed in 1992 by the then Chairman of the CFTC. In a letter to the
Chairman of the House subcommittee with oversight responsibility
for the CFTC, Wendy Gramm stated: "In the Commission's experi-
ence, commercial reality dictates that the legality of a forward con-
tract be based upon the objective standard of a legally enforceable
obligation between commercial entities to make or take delivery, cou-
pled with the commercial capacity to do so."93
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 39,191.
93. Letter from Wendy Gramm (then CFTC Chairperson) to Glenn English, Chairman of
the House of Representatives Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit and Rural Dev. (May 4, 1992).
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E. The CFTC's Ambivalence and the A-Mark Decision
Despite the CFTC's apparent moves away from the Delivery Re-
quirement as the touchstone for identification of a forward contract,
the CFTC's inherent ambivalence on the issue became apparent al-
most immediately in its response to the district court's opinion in
Krommenhoek v. A-Mark Precious Metals Inc.94 A-Mark Precious
Metals Incorporated ("A-Mark"), a wholesale precious metals dealer,
had been doing a cash-and-carry business in gold and silver with Keith
D. Bybee, Sr. ("Bybee"), a retail precious metals dealer. Beginning in
1982, Bybee purchased gold and silver from A-Mark by means of so-
called "Deferred Delivery (margin) Sales" contracts. Pursuant to
these Deferred Delivery contracts, Bybee made a down payment of
ten or twenty percent; the metals were to be delivered upon payment
of the balance (purportedly within two years), and A-Mark held a lien
on the metal until it received full payment. By the terms of the De-
ferred Delivery contracts, Bybee had no right to terminate the con-
tracts other than by full payment and acceptance of delivery, and he
certaaly had no right to discharge his obligations through exchange-
style offset. Nevertheless, over ninety-five percent of Bybee's margin
purchases were closed or offset without delivery. Furthermore, A-
Mark did not enforce the provision of these contracts that required
Bybee to take delivery within two years.
Bybee was not playing the metals markets with his own money.
He sold silver to his retail customers, obtained full payment from
them up front, and told them they could store their metal at A-Mark
for up to two years at no cost. Bybee then used the customer pay-
ments to enter into Deferred Delivery contracts rather than purchase
silver for immediate delivery as he had been instructed. In other
words, Bybee used his customers' money "to gamble on the price of
silver with no intention of taking delivery. ' 95 The customers were un-
aware of Bybee's scheme and believed their silver was stored at A-
Mark and available for delivery free of any liens. Inevitably, the price
of silver declined, A-Mark demanded additional margin, Bybee de-
faulted, A-Mark sold the silver, Bybee speculated with the minimal
proceeds he received and lost everything, and Bybee filed for bank-
ruptcy protection. The trustee-in-bankruptcy, Krommenhoek, sued
A-Mark on the ground, among others, that the Deferred Delivery
94. [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,952 (D. Idaho July 9,
1990).
95. Id. at 37,485.
19961
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
contracts were illegal off-exchange futures contracts. Both the bank-
ruptcy court and the district court held that these contracts were for-
ward contracts. 96
It should be noted that the District Court ruled before the CFTC
issued its 1990 Interpretation. Notwithstanding the unavailability of
that precedent, the district court ruled that the Deferred Delivery con-
tracts between A-Mark and Bybee were not futures contracts because
Bybee was "a commercial precious metals dealer," the "public was not
involved" in the contracts, and "Congress has determined that such
activities [i.e., those involving "savvy commercial entities, well-versed
in the commodities they trade"97] should flow freely without the drag-
ging anchor of regulation. ' 98 Interestingly, the court did not cite the
CFTC's 1977 Interpretation, but it was strongly influenced by a 1986
Report of the Committee on Commodities Regulation of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York.99 This lengthy and thoughtful
Report concludes that as a "general rule" commercial off-exchange
"principal to principal" transactions that involve only "commercial, fi-
nancial, and other institutional parties" and not "the general public"
are within the "parameters enumerated" by "congressional policy and
the legislative history underlying the [CEA for inclusion within] ...
the forward contract exclusion." 100
Unfortunately, in restating the Report's conclusion, the district
court stated baldly that the Deferred Delivery contracts "have all the
indications of futures contracts save one: the public was not involved
.... The congressional intent behind the Commodity Exchange Act
was not to regulate transactions between commercial entities."'1 1 On
its face this statement is simply wrong. For example, a transaction on
the Chicago Board of Trade is not transformed from a futures contract
to a forward contract merely because the parties are commercials.
With more sensitivity to the nuances of the Report's conclusion, but
no less instinct for the right result, the district court could have
reached the same result by holding that a bilateral off-exchange con-
tract between commercial counterparties that does not, by its terms,
allow a right of exchange-style offset is an exempt forward contract.
96. See id. at 37,486.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See The Committee on Commodities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, The Forward Contract Exclusion: An Analysis of Off-Exchange Commodity-
Based Instruments, 41 Bus. LAW. 853 (1986) [hereinafter Report].
100. Id. at 871, 899.
101. Krommenhoek, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 37,485-486.
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Indeed, a sympathetic reading of the district court opinion suggests
that this is what it intended.
The district court's careless statement that transactions that do
not involve the public are not futures transactions caused the CFTC
and the major futures exchanges sufficient concern that they filed ami-
cus curiae briefs in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Given that the
CFTC issued its 1990 Interpretation shortly after the district court's
opinion was handed down and shortly before it filed its amicus
brief,102 one would have expected the CFTC to use this occasion to
amplify its 1990 Interpretation and illustrate the application of the
new right-of-offset standard outside the context of the Brent oil mar-
ket. Without explanation, however, the CFTC did not even refer to its
1990 Interpretation in its brief. 103
Furthermore, Bybee's transactions with A-Mark raised a host of
issues relevant to the futures/forwards distinction. For example, was
Bybee truly a "commercial" counterparty, as the district court held?
If he was such generally, was he a commercial counterparty with re-
spect to those transactions involving unauthorized speculation with his
clients' money? Should the fact that his activities were unauthorized
be relevant to the classification of the contracts as futures or forwards
so long as A-Mark believed in good faith that Bybee was a commer-
cial counterparty? Did Bybee have the capacity to take delivery, that
is, to bear the risks of such transactions? How should this factor be
weighed against A-Mark's knowledge of and belief about Bybee's ca-
pacity? What should be made of Bybee's intent? Obviously his trans-
actions were speculative and not entered into for a commercial
purpose related to his business as a retail metals dealer. But the ma-
jor motivations in Brent market activity are hedging, speculation, and
tax spinning and many transactions are unrelated to any business of
the participants involving the production, processing, or distribution
of oil.104 And what about the absence of an intent to take delivery? It
is clear that the Deferred Delivery contracts, just as the 15-day Brent
contracts, did not contain a right of exchange-style offset. In both sit-
uations, however, actual delivery occurred very infrequently. Is there,
nevertheless, a distinction to be drawn between the two situations
102. The district court's opinion was issued on July 9, 1990, the effective date of the 1990
Interpretation was September 25, 1990, and the CFTC filed its brief in In re Bybee on December
17, 1990.
103. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, In re Bybee,
945 F.2d 309 (No. 90-35604) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bybee Brief].
104. See Bybee, 945 F.2d at 314, 315.
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such that the Deferred Delivery contracts Bybee used fell outside of
the 1990 Interpretation?
The CFTC chose to address none of these questions. Indeed, it
did not even take a position on whether the Deferred Delivery con-
tracts were futures or forward contracts. The only issue the CFTC did
address was "whether public involvement is a critical definitional ele-
ment of a 'contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery' within
the meaning of section 2(a)(i)(A) of the CEA. ' 10 5 As pointed out
above, the answer to this question is clearly "no," but this question is
hardly the most important jurisdictional issue the court faced. Yet the
CFTC's seventeen-page brief never once addressed any other issue.
Worse, however, than the CFTC's failure to provide the issue ex-
plication expected of the federal agency to whom the appellate court
was prepared to give "great deference," 10 6 was the CFTC's disingenu-
ous discussion of the one issue it did address: public involvement.
Keep in mind, as the circuit court did not do, that all contracts for
future or deferred delivery of commodities are either futures contracts
or forward contracts and there is no undivided middle. As the 1978
Memorandum points out, "[i]ts plain and literal meaning, however, [of
the phrase "contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery"] en-
compasses any contract for the delivery of a specified commodity at a
later date. ' 10 7 Thus, standing alone, this phrase would encompass-
and bring within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction-all executory con-
tracts for commodities. But, of course, the concept of a "futures con-
tract" does not stand alone; it is set in opposition to and draws its
meaning from the forward contract exclusion.
It makes no sense, therefore, to talk about the characteristics of
future contracts without contrasting them with the characteristics of
forward contracts. In its decision in Co Petro, the Ninth Circuit ana-
lyzed the contracts at issue as though two questions needed to be an-
swered: (1) were those agreements within the exclusion for cash
forward contracts, and (2) if not, were they futures contracts.10 8 But
there is really only one question: Is an executory contract for the fu-
ture delivery of a commodity to be classified as a futures contract or as
a forward contract? By the plain and literal language of the statute,
such a contract cannot be both, and it cannot be neither.
105. Bybee Brief, supra note 103.
106. Bybee, 945 F.2d at 314-15.
107. 1978 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 13,498.
108. See CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1982).
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It its brief in Bybee, the CFTC repeatedly argues that "public in-
volvement has never been recognized as an essential element in the
definition of a futures contract."'109 That is correct as far as it goes,
but what the CFTC fails to point out to the court is that public in-
volvement frequently has been recognized as foreclosing the availabil-
ity of the forward contract exclusion. 1 0 The absence of public
participation does not mean that contracts are not futures contracts.
According to substantial precedent, however, the presence of public
participation does mean that contracts that do not routinely settle by
delivery are most certainly not forward contracts. Furthermore, the
CFTC's own insistence that the availability of the forward contract
exclusion depends upon the presence of commercial counterparties
transacting in connection with their businesses"' is simply the oppo-
site side of the "public participation" coin.
Given the paucity of guidance provided by the CFTC, its failure
to cite, much less discuss, its 1990 Interpretation, and its repetitious
insistence that public participation is not a necessary characteristic of
futures contracts, it is hardly surprising that the court of appeals made
a muddle of the law in deciding the case. On the one hand, relying on
Stovall and Co Petro, the court held that the Deferred Delivery con-
tracts between A-Mark and Bybee were futures contracts. 112 In doing
so, the court emphasized that even contracts that are not wholly stan-
dardized as to their terms can be futures contracts if the seller, as did
A-Mark, "implicitly guarantees that it will provide for offset." 113 On
the other hand, relying on the 1990 Interpretation, the court held that
the Deferred Delivery contracts were forward contracts. 14 Acknowl-
edging that the "concept of delivery is the determining factor" 1 5 for
distinguishing futures contracts from forward contracts, the court
characterized the 1990 Interpretation as a "real innovation" in the ap-
propriate understanding of the delivery requirement." 6 Finding that
"A-Mark and Bybee had the legal obligation to make or take delivery
109. Bybee Brief, supra note 103.
110. See, e.g., Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 578; In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,941 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979); Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63.
111. See 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 39,191; The Regulation of Leverage Transac-
tions and Other Off-Exchange Future Delivery Type Instruments-Statutory Interpretation, 50
Fed. Reg. 11,656-67 (CFTC 1985).
112. See Bybee, 945 F.2d at 313.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 315.
115. Id. at 313.
116. See id. at 313-14.
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upon the demand of the other," the court held that their transactions
fit squarely within the CFTC's 1990 Interpretation. 117
Of course, the Ninth Circuit was wrong in holding that the De-
ferred Delivery contracts were both futures contracts and forward
contracts-although as a practical matter, only the forward contract
holding had effect, because the contracts were not invalidated. And,
of course, the CFTC was unhappy with the decision. 118 But what is
most important about Bybee is that it points out the unresolved con-
flict between the so-called "classic" analysis of the forward contract
exclusion found in Stovall, Co Petro, and their progeny, and the "real
innovation" in the analysis of that exclusion found in the Swaps Policy
Statement and the 1990 Interpretation. Because of this unresolved
conflict and because of the unsatisfactory nature of both the Delivery
Requirement and the new right-of-offset standard in the 1990 Inter-
pretation, the CFTC has increasingly relied on purposeful ambiguity
to carry out its regulatory role. The following analyses of the BT and
MGRM Orders may help to explain why the conflict between these
analyses remains unresolved and why neither of these analyses of the
forward contract exclusion is satisfactory.
III. ANALYSIS OF BT ORDER
The BT order arose out of particularly egregious conduct by BT
Securities Corporation ("BT Securities") in its sales of derivative
products to Gibson Greetings, Inc. ("Gibson"). BT Securities is an
affiliate of Bankers Trust Company ("Bankers Trust") and acts as
Bankers Trust's representative in negotiating interest rate swaps and
other derivative transactions in which Bankers Trust participates.' 19
117. The court stated:
The underlying postulate of the exclusion is that the Act's regulatory scheme for
futures trading simply should not apply to private commercial merchandising transac-
tions which create enforceable obligations to deliver but in which delivery is deferred for
reasons of commercial convenience and necessity [citation omitted].
Here, both A-Mark and Bybee had the legal obligation to make or take delivery
upon demand of the other. Accordingly, consistent with the Statutory Interpretation,
we conclude section 2(a)(1) of the CEA precludes application of the exchange trading
requirement to these transactions.
Id. 945 F.2d at 315 (quoting 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 39,190).
118. The CFTC expressed its concern with "the court's unprecedented expansion of the for-
ward contract exclusion to cover agreements where delivery of the commodity apparently was
not contemplated, that it would provide for offsetting contracts without the need for delivery."
COMMODITIES FuTUREs TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR REG-
ULATION 145 (Oct. 1993). It would appear that it is the CFTC and not the court that is responsi-
ble for the "unprecedented expansion" of the forward contracts exclusion.
119. See Defendant Bankers Trust Co.'s Countercl. j 2, Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers
Trust Co., No. C-1-94-620 (W.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 1994).
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Bankers Trust was the counterparty to each of the derivative products
BT Securities sold to Gibson.
Gibson had issued fifty million dollars of fixed rate notes in May
1991. Shortly thereafter rates declined and Gibson sought to reduce
its net borrowing cost through the use of interest rate swaps. Bankers
Trust was Gibson's "lead bank.' 120 As Gibson sought proposals from
various dealers as to how it might reduce its interest costs over the life
of the notes, Bankers Trust introduced BT Securities to Gibson.121 In
November of 1991, representatives of BT Securities proposed and
Gibson entered into a two-year fixed-for-floating interest rate swap,
followed for the next three years by a floating-for-fixed interest rate
swap.122 This swap was terminated in July 1992, at a gain to Gibson.1 23
From that time until March 1994, representatives of BT Securities
proposed and Gibson entered into eleven distinct derivatives transac-
tions, many of which were amended several times and terminated in
whole or in part. "Over time, the derivatives sold to Gibson by BT
Securities became increasingly complex, risky and intertwined."' 124
More problematic was that the valuation of these derivatives de-
pended on sophisticated computer models that Bankers Trust had and
Gibson did not. Gibson, therefore, relied upon BT Securities for the
valuations of these derivatives used in Gibson's financial statements.
But BT Securities lied to Gibson in providing it with these valuations
and, as a result, the values reflected in Gibson's financial statements
"significantly understated the magnitude of Gibson's losses."'1 25
A. Regulatory Actions Against BT Securities
It appears clear from the available information that BT Securities
made material misrepresentations and omissions in the offer and sale
of derivatives to Gibson.126 From a regulatory perspective, however,
the issue is what, if any, violations of law BT Securities had thereby
committed. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("FRBNY") was
120. See Complaint & Jury Demand 7, Gibson Greetings, No. C-1-94-620.
121. See id. Based on the allegations in the Gibson Complaint, it appears that BT Securities
had no prior relationship with Gibson and provided no advice to Gibson other than with respect
to derivative products the counterparty to which was Bankers Trust.
122. See id. 15.
123. See id. T 17.
124. BT Order, supra note 1, 7.
125. Id. 1 11.
126. But see, Hanley & Moser, supra note 6, at 25, wherein Hanley and Moser provide possi-
ble explanations for differences between quoted prices, market prices, and book value after not-




the first to act in the matter, entering into a "Written Agreement"
with Bankers Trust and BT Securities on December 4, 1994.127 While
not explicitly finding any violations of law and, indeed, pointedly
avoiding any discussion of the facts surrounding this matter, the Writ-
ten Agreement does note that it is being entered into "to ensure com-
pliance with applicable federal and state laws, rules and
regulations"'128 and then proceeds to impose a series of quite severe
and unique restrictions on the activities of Bankers Trust and BT Se-
curities with respect to so-called leveraged derivative transactions. 129
Approximately two weeks later, the SEC and the CFTC simulta-
neously announced the institution and settlement of separate adminis-
trative proceedings against BT Securities. 130 The SEC action was
straightforward. It characterized two of the derivatives transactions
BT Securities sold to Gibson as securities,' 3' found that BT Securities
had made "material misrepresentations and omissions in the offer and
sale" of these securities, held that those misrepresentations and omis-
sions constituted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, and ordered that BT Securities be subject to
various sanctions.132 Certainly, the wisdom of the SEC's action can be
questioned 133 and the basis for its characterization of these derivatives
127. See Written Agreement by and among Bankers Trust New York Corp., Bankers Trust
Co. and BT Sec. Corp. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Nos. 94-082WA/RB-HC, 94-
082WAIRB-SM, 94-082WA/RB-HCS (Dec. 4, 1994).
128. Id.
129. See id. For a summary of the restrictions, see Alton B. Harris & Andrea S. Kramer,
Suitability and Derivatives Transactions: Inconsistencies, Developments, and Lessons for the Fu-
ture, DERIVATIVES Q. (Spring 1995). The FRBNY's action against Bankers Trust and BT Securi-
ties has been the subject of substantial comment. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Bankers Trust
Settlement: Whither the Swaps Market?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 1995, at 5; Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging
Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 985 (1995); David Sienko, The Aftermath of Derivatives Losses: Can Sophisticated Inves-
tors Invoke the Suitability Doctrine Against Dealers Under Current Law?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
105 (1995).
130. See BT Order, supra note 1, 7; In re BT Securities Corp., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
8579, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477 (S.E.C. Dec. 22, 1994).
131. The SEC found the Treasury-Linked Swap, the Knock-Out Call Option, and the amend-
ments to those derivatives were securities under the federal securities laws. According to the
SEC, the Treasury-Linked Swap was "a cash-settled put option" based on a group of United
States government securities and the Knock-Out Call Option also was an option on a security.
The SEC repeated this assertion in other settlement releases arising from the Gibson Greetings
matter, but apparently has yet to claim jurisdiction over swap agreements other than the Treas-
ury-Linked Swap and the Knock-Out Call Option. See, e.g., In re Mitchell A. Vazquez, 1996 WL
86528, at *4 n.4 (S.E.C. Feb. 29, 1996).
132. See BT Order, supra note 1, 1 11.
133. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 129; Hanley & Moser, supra note 6.
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transactions as securities can be challenged. 134 However, the SEC
cannot be criticized for being unclear or ambiguous as to the basis for
its claim to jurisdiction in this case. The SEC put its credibility where
its sanctions were. It articulated its basis for characterizing specifically
identified derivatives transactions as securities, and it laid out the rea-
sons for there having been fraud in connection with their offer or sale.
So far as assertions of its own jurisdictional reach go, little more can
be expected from a federal agency.
In contrast to the SEC, the CFTC chose to proceed against BT
Securities based on what appears to be a purposefully ambiguous ba-
sis. The CFTC made virtually the same findings as the SEC did with
respect to BT Securities' misrepresentations and omissions. The
CFTC did not, however, then identify or even explicitly claim that any
of the derivative transactions recommended by BT Securities to Gib-
son were future contracts or commodity options. 135 The CFTC did list
and describe each of the twelve distinct derivatives that Gibson en-
tered into with Bankers Trust, but it did not find or even suggest that
any of these transactions were futures contracts or commodity op-
tions.136 What the CFTC found, instead, was that BT Securities had
"entered into an advisory relationship with Gibson which ... is suffi-
cient to cause BT Securities to have become a commodity trading ad-
visor with respect to its derivatives transactions with Gibson"' 37 and
that BT Securities violated the antifraud provision in the CEA appli-
cable to a commodity trading advisor. 38
134. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 129. In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F.
Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1996), Judge John Feiken found that the swap agreements at issue
were not securities. The key swap, referred to as the 5s/30s Swap, was similar to, but certainly
not identical to the Treasury-Linked Swap the SEC found to be a security in its BT Order. See
id. While it is possible (to attempt) to reconcile the SEC's BT Order and its reaffirmation of its
conclusion with Judge Feiken's decision, e.g., Becker et al., What is a Security after Proctor &
Gamble v. Bankers Trust? (July 1996) (on file with author), the two appear in serious conflict.
The Judge Feiken opinion is flawed in so many respects, however, that any ultimate reconcilia-
tion of the SEC's view as to when a swap is a security with judicial precedent will have to await a
more careful and knowledgeable opinion.
135. By reason of section 4c(b) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1994), it is illegal to enter into
transactions involving an option on a commodity in contravention of the Rules of the CFTC.
Under 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1996), OTC commodity option transactions are unlawful absent com-
pliance with § 32.4(a), the so-called "trade option" provisions or other CFTC created exemp-
tions. In any event, commodity option transactions are subject to section 32.9, a broad antifraud
provision comparable to the SEC's Rule 10b-5.
135. See BT Order, supra note 1.
137. Id. 7.
138. See id. § II. This conclusion is based on the following finding: "BT Securities' managing
director for the Gibson account told his supervisor in February 1994 that, 'from the very begin-
ning, [Gibson] just, you know, really put themselves in our hands like 96% .... And we have
known that from day one.' The managing director also told the Bankers Trust relationship of-
ficer responsible for the Gibson account that 'these guys [Gibson] have done some pretty wild
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Under the CEA, a person that falls with the definition of a "com-
modity trading adviser" 139 ("CTA") is required to register with the
CFTC,140 comply with various regulatory requirements, primarily with
respect to specified disclosures, 141 and observe the prohibitions in sec-
tion 4(o) against engaging in fraudulent activity of any sort with re-
spect to any client.' 42 Having summarily found that BT Securities was
stuff. And you know, they probably do not understand it quite as well as they should. I think
that they have a pretty good understanding of it, but not perfect. And that's like perfect for us."'
Id. In P & G, Judge Feiken found that, while BT "came close to giving advice," because P & G
representatives used "their own independent knowledge of market conditions in forming their
own expectation as to what the market would do in [these swaps]," BT was not a CTA. Procter
& Gamble Co., 925 F. Supp at 1287. Whatever the differences between the Gibson and P & G
situation that could have lead to different results with respect to the status of BT as a CTA,
Judge Feiken's analysis is certainly wrong.
139. C.E.A. § la(5), 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (1996), defines, in relevant part, a commodity trading
advisor as follows:
(A) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term "commodity
trading advisor" means any person who-
(i) for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications, writings, or electronic media, as to the value of or
the advisability of trading in-
(I) any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery made or to be
made on or subject to the rules of a contract market;
(II) any commodity option authorized under section 4c [7 U.S.C.S. § 6c]; or
(III) any leverage transaction authorized under section 19 [7 U.S.C.S. § 23];
or
(ii) for compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or promul-
gates analyses or reports concerning any of the activities referred to in clause (i).
(B) Exclusions. Subject to subparagraph (C), the term "commodity trading advisor"
does not include-
(i) any bank or trust company or any person acting as an employee thereof;
(ii) any news reporter, news columnist, or news editor of the print or electronic
media, or any lawyer, accountant, or teacher;
(iii) any floor broker or futures commission merchant;
(iv) the publisher or producer of any print or electronic data of general and regu-
lar dissemination, including its employees;
(v) the fiduciary of any defined benefit plan that is subject to the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.);
(vi) any contract market; and
(vii) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph as the Commission
may specify by rule, regulation or order.
(C) Incidental services. Subparagraph (B) shall apply only if the furnishing of such
services by persons referred to in subparagraph (B) is solely incidental to the conduct
of their business or profession.
140. See C.E.A. § 4m, 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1996). See also 17 C.F.R. § 4.14 (1996); C.F.R. § 35.2
(1996) (exempting "any person.., offering, entering into, rendering advice, or rendering other
services with respect to" exempted swap agreements from all provisions of the CEA with certain
exceptions, including sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4b and 4o).
141. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.31, .34, .35 (1996).
142. See C.E.A. § 4o(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1) (1996), provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for a commodity trading advisor, associated person of a commodity
trading advisor ... by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, directly or indirectly-
(A) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or participant
or prospective client or participant; or
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a CTA, the CFTC then took the unsurprising and quite appropriate
step-assuming its characterization of BT Securities as a CTA was
correct-of holding that BT Securities had "employed devices,
schemes, and artifices to defraud Gibson in violation of section
4(o)(1)(A) .... "143 The CFTC did not find that BT Securities had
violated the CEA by failing to register as a CTA (it had not so regis-
tered), nor did it find that BT Securities was otherwise delinquent
under any other requirement of the CEA applicable to CTAs.
B. The CFTC's "Deft Side-Stepping" of the Jurisdictional Issues
In order to find that BT Securities had violated Rule 10b-5, the
SEC was required to demonstrate that the fraud had occurred "in con-
nection with" the purchase or sale of securities. 144 By finding that BT
Securities was a CTA and charging it with violating section
4(o)(1)(A), the CFTC had no comparable burden. 45 This is so be-
cause section 4(o) broadly prohibits a CTA from using "any device,
scheme or artifice to defraud any client . . . or prospective client
.... 91146 That is, if BT Securities is a CTA, then whether its "scheme
to defraud" Gibson occurred in connection with a transaction in a fu-
tures contract or commodity option was not an issue, for if BT Securi-
ties defrauded a "client" then the nature of the product or scheme
involved in the fraud is irrelevant.
To some commentators, the CFTC's decision to proceed against
BT Securities under section 4(o) was laudatory because it avoided any
explicit or even implicit characterization of the derivatives transac-
(B) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or participant or prospective client or participant.
143. BT Order, supra note 1, at 30.
144. Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
145. By contrast, the general fraud provision in section 4b of the CEA prohibits "any person
... in connection with ... any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery ... to cheat
or defraud ... [any] person .. " There is no mention of section 4b in the BT Order.
146. A similar structure exists on the securities side. Under § 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (1996), an investment adviser (whether registered or not) is
prohibited from employing "any device, scheme, or, artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client." There is no discussion in the SEC's order of BT Securities status as an investment ad-
viser or the applicability of § 206 to its conduct.
1996]
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tions between Bankers Trust and Gibson as futures contracts or com-
modity options. For example, John Coffee praised the CFTC's
"restraint" in avoiding any legal characterization of these transac-
tions. 147 In his view, the CFTC's "deft side-stepping" of the "prob-
lematic issue" of whether derivative contracts are appropriately
classified as futures contracts or commodities options, resulted in the
CFTC acting "far less intrusively" than the SEC.148 By refusing to
take "the definitional issue on frontally" 149 and asserting only "rela-
tively narrow jurisdictional grounds" 50 for its actions, the CFTC
"sought only to remedy the over-reaching that was clearly de-
tected"'15 and thereby "avoided the unnecessary issue of which
agency [the CFTC or SEC] had the stronger claim to jurisdiction over
the OTC derivatives market.' 52
Coffee's praise of the CFTC's chosen means of proceeding is hard
to understand. The CFTC was able to accomplish its "deft side-step-
ping" 153 of the jurisdictional issues only because it declared, without
further discussion, that BT Securities was a CTA. Coffee appears to
support this classification. 154 Indeed, he comments that "[b]ecause
most brokers and dealers handle some commodities transactions, they
can fall under the CEA's definition of 'commodity trading advisor,'
even if the particular transaction in which the fraud occurs does not
involve a futures contract or commodity option.' 55 But this is mis-
leading. First, broker-dealers that merely handle some commodity
transactions are not CTA's; they fall within the definition only if they
engage "in the business of advising others ... as to ... the advisability
of trading in [commodity interests]".156 Second, while a violation of
section 4(o) does not require a finding that the CTA committed fraud
in connection with a futures contract or commodity option, section
4(o) does require a finding that the CTA sought to defraud a "client
... or prospective client .... ,157 In other words, to support a finding
of a violation of section 4(o), the CFTC must establish not just a
CTA's scheme to defraud, but a CTA's scheme to defraud a client,
147. See Coffee, supra note 129, at 6.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 36.
153. Id. at 6.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 5.
156. C.E.A. § la(5), 7 U.S.C. §la(5) (1994). See supra note 142.
157. C.E.A. § 4(o), 7 U.S.C. § 6(o) (1994).
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that is, someone with respect to whom the CTA provides advice of the
sort that gives rise to its being a CTA. 158
In the case of BT Securities, the CFTC's finding of a violation of
section 4(o) depends on the assertion that the firm "entered into an
advisory relationship with Gibson."'1 59 We know from Gibson's own
action against BT Securities that Gibson had no prior relationship
with BT Securities. Also we know from the CFTC's BT Order that all
of the derivative products that BT Securities sold to Gibson are de-
scribed in Appendix A to that order (the "Appendix A transac-
tions"). 160 Therefore, if there was, in fact, an "advisory relationship"
between BT Securities and Gibson, then BT Securities must have ad-
vised Gibson with respect to "the advisability of trading in:" (1) fu-
tures contracts "made on or subject to the rules of a contract market,"
(2) permissible commodity options, or (3) authorized leverage trans-
actions. 16' Further, since the only transactions about which BT Secur-
ities advised Gibson are those described in Appendix A to the BT
order, the CFTC must necessarily be claiming that one or more of the
Appendix A transactions are futures, commodity options, or leverage
contracts.
Professor Coffee's view that the CFTC "deftly side-stepped" ju-
risdictional classification of the challenged instruments is, thus, quite
wide of the mark. Rather than showing what Coffee has characterized
as "restraint in not explicitly characterizing the instruments as futures
or commodities options,"' 62 in the BT Order, the CFTC called into
question the legal status of all of the Appendix A transactions. The
SEC, by taking "the definitional issue on frontally,"'163 had laid its ju-
risdictional cards on the table, made its argument for classification of
two of the Appendix A transactions as securities, and offered its oppo-
nents a clearly articulated position with which to argue.
In contrast, the CFTC cast a legal shadow over all of the other
Appendix A transactions. The CFTC necessarily, although implicitly,
found that one or more of these transactions is a futures contract or
commodity option, but it did not identify which one or ones and why.
The CFTC did not "deftly side-step" the jurisdictional issue, but
rather claimed jurisdiction based on purposefully ambiguous grounds.
158. See id.
159. BT Order, supra note 1, at 8.
160. See id. at 3.
161. See C.E.A. § la(5), 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (1994). See supra note 142.




This is not the hallmark of an agency motivated by jurisdictional "re-
straint" but rather one concerned more about its jurisdictional reach
than precedential guidance, consistent policy making, or intellectual
integrity. This is not a pretty picture.
C. The Muddled Legal Status of Swaps
If we assume, as we must, that the legal classification of certain
Appendix A transactions provided the CFTC with its sole basis for
action against BT Securities, then it is important to determine as much
as we can about the nature of those transactions. What do we know?
First, we know that BT Securities' status as a CTA depends on one or
more of these transactions being futures contracts made on or subject
to the rules of a contract market, permissible commodity options, or
authorized leverage contracts. However, none of these transactions
involved a futures transaction made on a contract market or a lever-
age transaction. 164 Therefore, it appears that the CFTC must view one
or more of the Appendix A transactions as commodity options subject
to its jurisdiction. 165 Yet if this is so, why did the CFTC not charge BT
164. Leverage transactions involve the delivery of a commodity pursuant to a standardized
contract known in the trade as a margin account, margin contract, leverage account, or leverage
contract or any arrangement serving the same function. See C.E.A. § 19,7 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1994).
The Appendix A transactions were customized (presumably for Gibson) and therefore could not
be considered standardized contracts falling within the definition of a leverage transaction.
165. This is entirely consistent with an analysis of the Appendix A transactions. See BT
Order, supra note 1, at A-1. Apart from the initial fixed-for-floating and floating-for-fixed swaps
and the two transactions which the SEC asserted were options on securities (which if correct,
would be subject to the SEC's jurisdiction without any residual CFTC authority), all but two of
the remaining transactions had embedded in them various options on the London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). See id. at A-1 to A-8. If LIBOR is a commodity, which it clearly
appears to be given that futures contracts are traded on it, e.g. futures on One-Month LIBOR,
then options on LIBOR are certainly commodity options. CEA section la(3) defines a com-
modity to include "all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in." C.E.A. § la(3), 7 U.S.C. §la(3) (1994). CEA section 4c(b)
and CFTC Rule 1.3 define commodity option transactions as any transaction or agreement in
interstate commerce involving a commodity "which is or is held out to be of the character of, or
is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option,' 'privilege,' indemnity,' 'bid,' 'offer,' 'call,' 'put,'
'advance guaranty,' or 'decline guaranty."' Certain of the transactions appear to have been pure
options, e.g., the Periodic Floor ("Bankers Trust would pay Gibson a floating payment of 6-
month LIBOR plus .28% times $30 million while Gibson would pay Bankers Trust the six-month
LIBOR rate as long as the six-month LIBOR rate was not more than .15% points lower than the
LIBOR rate on the immediately preceding swap coupon calculation date), while others were
more complex transactions with a collection of embedded options, e.g., Spread Lock 1 (Bankers
Trust would pay Gibson a fixed payment equal to $30 million times the sum of the "mid-Market
Swap Spread" and the "On-The-Run Treasury Rate" while Gibson would pay Bankers Trust a
fixed payment of $30 million times the sum of the "Spread Lock," set at 38 basis points, and the
"Off-The-Run Treasury Rate.") See BT Order, supra note 1, at A-2.
In the P & G decision, Judge Feiken held that the swaps at issue there "may not" be com-
modity options because they are "exempt from CFTC rules" rather than "authorized under sec-
tion 6c." Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp 1270, 1287 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
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Securities with a violation of section 32.9, the provision in the CFTC's
Regulations prohibiting fraud in connection with commodity option
transactions? One can only conclude that the CFTC chose not to do
so to avoid an explicit statement as to the basis for its jurisdictional
claims.
Second, no conclusion can be drawn one way or the other as to
whether the CFTC viewed any of the Appendix A transactions as fu-
tures contracts. It is readily apparent from an analysis of these trans-
actions that none were futures contracts made on or subject to the
rules of a commodity exchange, and thus none of them could have
been the basis for the CFTC's finding that BT Securities was a CTA.
Nevertheless, some or all of these transactions might still be viewed by
the CFTC as off-exchange futures contracts. The CFTC does not say
that they are or that they are not; it simply does not say anything
about the issue.166
Third, in its press release announcing the entry of the BT Order,
the CFTC stated that "all" of the Appendix A transactions were
"swaps" and that the action against BT Securities was "brought under
the antifraud authority [the CFTC] retained in the Commission's
swaps exemption .... ,,167 The definition of "swaps" in the Swaps
Exemption is certainly broad enough to encompass the plain vanilla,
ratio, and time swaps described in Appendix A as well as the remain-
ing essentially option-like transactions into which Gibson entered.168
Thus, there is no question that the swap contracts between Banker's
Given that the Swap Exemption specifically references section 6c among its authorizing provi-
sions, it is difficult to understand the significance of the distinction the Judge believed he was
making.
166. Indeed, Chairperson Schapiro stated that "by bringing this action, the Commission did
not intend to change the existing legal environment for trading these instruments. Nor did it
signal an intent to regulate these transactions." Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks to the
National Capital Chapter of the National Association of Business Economists (Feb. 15, 1995)
(transcript on file with author).
167. CFTC Rule 35 does not exempt persons from the provisions of sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4b,
and 40 of the CEA; Rule 32.9; nor from the provisions of sections 6(c) and 9(a)(2) of the CEA to
the extent "these provisions prohibit manipulation of the market price of any commodity in
interstate commerce or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of a contract market." 17
C.F.R. § 35.2 (1996).
168. CFTC Rule 35.1(b)(1) defines a swap agreement as:
(i) an agreement ... which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, forward rate agree-
ment, commodity swap, interest rate option, forward foreign exchange agreement, rate
cap agreement, rate floor agreement, rate collar agreement, currency swap agreement,
cross-currency rate swap agreement, currency option, any other similar agreement (in-
cluding any option to enter into any of the foregoing);
(ii) any combination of the foregoing; or
(iii) a master agreement for any of the foregoing together with all supplements thereto.
17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(1).
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Trust and Gibson fell within the swaps exemption. However, just be-
cause a contract falls within the swaps exemption does not mean that
that contract is, therefore, a futures contract or commodity option
subject to the CFTC's jurisdiction. And that is the rub.
Look first at precisely what the CFTC did in adopting the swaps
exemption. It exempted "swap agreements" from most provisions of
the CEA except the antifraud provisions, and in doing so it explicitly
stated that it was not making any determination that swaps generally
or in specific circumstances are futures contracts or commodity op-
tions.169 In other words, the swaps exemption was premised on the
proposition that whether swaps are or are not futures or commodity
options need not be decided. The concept was that the swap market is
important and if it operates within the minimal constraints of the ex-
emption it is not in need of regulation. Therefore, if a swap falls
within the terms of the exemption, it may be freely sold without the
need for a determination of whether it is or is not otherwise subject to
the CFTC's jurisdiction.
The action against BT Securities ended the CFTC's agnosticism
with respect to the legal status of swaps. 170 In order to find that BT
Securities was a CTA, the CFTC had to find that at least one of the
"swaps" in Appendix A was a commodity option subject to its juris-
diction. But if at least one of the option-like swaps is, indeed, subject
to the CFTC's jurisdiction, what about the futures-like swaps? 171 The
former Chairman of the CFTC stated in early 1996 that "the Commis-
sion has not taken a position on whether swap agreements are futures
contracts."'1 72 This may be correct as far as it goes, but with the entry
of the BT Order, the CFTC has taken the position that certain
169. The CFTC said that "[tIhe issuance of this rule [the swaps exemption] should not be
construed as reflecting any determination that the swap agreements covered by the terms hereof
are subject to the Act, as the Commission has not made and is not obligated to make any such
determination." Final Rule on Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587,
5588 (CFTC 1993).
170. Responding to accusations that the BT Order was power grabbing, Mary Schapiro
stated: "We did not say that swaps are futures ... or use a statutory provision that says swaps are
futures." Tim W. Ferguson, Commodities Boss Forswears Future in Swaps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
1995, at 9.
171. The Plain Vanilla Swaps provided that "Gibson would pay Bankers Trust a fixed pay-
ment of 5.91% times $30 million while Bankers Trust would pay Gibson the 6 month [LIBOR
rate] times $30 million." BT Order, supra note 1, at A-1. The Ratio Swap provided that "Bank-
ers Trust would pay Gibson a fixed payment of 5.5% times $30,000,000 while Gibson would pay
Bankers Trust the 6-month LIBOR rate squared divided by 6% times $30,000,000.". Id.
172. Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, CFTC Chairperson, to the Hon. Pat Roberts, Chairman
Comm. on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives and the Hon. Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., Chair-




"swaps" are commodity options, and the fact that it has not clarified
the status of futures-like swap agreements should hardly be a source
of pride for the agency.
Shortly before she resigned from the CFTC, former Chairman
Mary L. Schapiro was quoted as stating that the CFTC's current legal
regime is a "patchwork quilt of interpretations, policy statements, and
...exemptions."'173 She went on to state that "[t]he market needs
certainty, and quite frankly, so do the regulators."'1 74 It is hard to ar-
gue with either statement, but it is also hard not to assign primary
responsibility for the existing legal uncertainty as to the regulatory
status of swaps to the CFTC itself. The BT Order did not provide
certainty but rather created uncertainty: uncertainty as to when swaps
that are essentially option-like instruments, such as caps, floors, and
collars, are commodity options; uncertainty as to when swaps with em-
bedded option-like features, such as transactions similar to the Spread
Lock transactions Gibson entered into with Bankers Trust, 175 are com-
modity options; and uncertainty as to when, if ever, traditional fu-
tures-like swaps, such as transactions similar to the Plain Vanilla and
Ratio Swaps Gibson entered into with Bankers Trust, 176 are futures
contracts. The markets do, indeed, need certainty, but the CFTC's
ambiguous jurisdictional claim in the BT Order is not the way they are
going to obtain it.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MGRM ORDER
In the MGRM Order, 177 the CFTC found that from at least De-
cember 1991, until at least December 1993, MGRM 178 "marketed, of-
fered and sold"'179 futures contracts in transactions not conducted on
or subject to the rules of a contract market and, thus, in violation of
section 4(a) of the CEA.180 These contracts, so-called "45-Day
Agreements," were one of several types of off-exchange contracts for
173. Schapiro Says Staff Review of Uncertainty in CFTC Legal Regime Could Be Done Soon,
27 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1917 (Dec. 8, 1995).
174. Id.
175. See supra note 165 (describing the Spread Lock transaction).
176. See supra note 171 (describing the Plain Vanilla and Ratios Swaps transaction).
177. MGRM Order, supra note 2.
178. MGRM, a Delaware corporation, is a subsidiary of MG Corporation, which is a subsidi-
ary of Metallgesellschaft, AG, a company "organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of
Germany." Id. at 2.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 6-7. The CFTC also found that MG Futures Inc., another subsidiary of MG
Corp. and a registered futures commission merchant (FCM), failed to notify the CFTC of mate-
rial inadequacies in its internal controls and failed to file with the CFTC certified financial re-
ports. See id. at 2-3. These violations are not discussed in this article.
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the future delivery of gasoline, heating oil, and diesel fuel that
MGRM had entered into during this period with commercial
counterparties, such as independent gasoline stations and heating oil
distributors. 18 1
To understand why the CFTC found that the 45-Day Agreements
were futures contracts and thus illegal, and MGRM's other energy
supply contracts presumably were neither, it would be useful to have
the contracts themselves to review. Unfortunately, the CFTC chose
not to append the contracts to its order, and, to date, neither it nor
MGRM has made them publicly available. Second best would be to
have a detailed description of the various supply contracts used by
MGRM. Unfortunately, again, the CFTC chose not to include such a
description in the MGRM Order. Third best, as it were, is what we
have: a sketchy and incomplete account in the MGRM Order of the
45-Day Agreements and essentially no account at all of the other sup-
ply contracts. The sections that follow discuss (1) what the CFTC
does say about the 45-Day Agreements and what more is known
about them and the other supply contracts, (2) the CFTC's legal anal-
ysis of why the 45-Day Agreements are illegal futures contracts, (3)
the nature of the CFTC's defense of its order and its critics attack on
it, and (4) an analysis of the fundamental problems with the MGRM
Order.
A. Nature of the Supply Contracts MGRM Had with Its Customers
1. The Contracts Themselves
In its order, the CFTC has the following to say about the 45-Day
Agreements: These Agreements were "among the contracts" MGRM
marketed, offered, and sold that "purportedly requir[ed] the delivery
in the future of gasoline, heating oil, and diesel fuel to commercial
counterparties .... -182 The price the purchasers were to pay upon the
future delivery of the petroleum product "was established by the par-
ties at initiation."'1 83 At initiation, no money exchanged hands.184
To obtain delivery, a purchaser tendered forty-five days advance
notice to MGRM.185 A purchaser was not, however, required to take
"any ratable, monthly deliveries of petroleum product."'1 86
181. See id. at 3.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 5.




Delivery of "any, or all, product ... could be deferred [for the
term of the contract, which was] five or ten years."'1 87 In the event
that prior to the end of the term of the 45-Day Agreement "the price
of the underlying product [based upon price levels of energy futures
contracts traded on the NYMEX] reached a preestablished exit level,"
a purchaser could "terminate the contract and obtain a cash payment
from MGR&M" by exercising a so-called 'blow-out' provision in the
contract.188
The Order contains no other information about the terms of the
45-Day Agreement. Based on various studies, reports and conversa-
tions, the following additional information about the 45-Day Agree-
ments, which are also referred to as "fixed-flexible contracts" or
"flexies," appears basically correct. The "blow-out" provision, or
what has been referred to as the cash-out or early liquidation option,
could be exercised for all or any part of the product deliverable under
contract whenever near-term NYMEX futures prices exceeded the
contract price. Apparently because of the potential size of MGRM's
contingent liability as the result of this short option position, MGRM
agreed to fully hedge its supply obligations at all times. In the event
the purchaser exercised the "blow-out" option, MGRM was obligated
to pay the purchaser any profits above the contract price realized on
liquidation of the hedge of the contract or part contract. Thus, one
hundred percent of the hedging profits were to be paid to the pur-
chaser, but the purchaser also bore the entire liquidation risk on the
hedge. The 45-Day Agreements also provided MGRM with an option
to put product to the purchaser at the end of the contract term to the
extent not previously delivered.
Apparently because of the risk of default on (or forced renegoti-
ation of) these long-term fixed-price supply contracts, MGRM limited
the annual volume that could be supplied to a purchaser to no more
than twenty percent of the purchaser's needs. Nevertheless, if the
blow-out option was out of the money and a purchaser had deferred
delivery until the end of the, say, five year contract, that purchaser
would be obligated to take delivery-and pay for-an entire year's
supply in one shot.
As for the other types of supply contracts that MGRM used, one
was a Firm Fixed-Price Agreement for the Sale of Petroleum Product





"blow-out" provision similar to that in the 45-Day Agreements or an
exit letter that caused the contract to be automatically canceled if the
NYMEX price exceeded a set price. In both cases, hedging profits
above the contract price were to be equally shared between MGRM
and the purchaser. The Firm Fixed Agreements required ratable,
monthly deliveries of a specified petroleum product. Although the
CFTC does not discuss or even mention the Firm Fixed Agreements
in the factual and legal findings sections of its Order, the sanctions
section of the Order contains an undertaking by MGRM that it "shall
not market, offer or sell Firm Fixed Price Agreements for the Sale of
Petroleum Product as sold between December 1991 and December
1993."189 The CFTC makes no finding that these Firm Fixed Agree-
ments are in any way illegal nor does it explain why, or on what basis,
it required MGRM to stop using them.
There remain a number of things that we do not know about the
45-Day Agreements. For example, were all of these agreements iden-
tical, or had purchasers individually negotiated various provisions?
Were all of these agreements for standardized commodity units, or
was the quantity of deliverable product tailored to the needs of each
purchaser? Were margin or mark-to-market payments required or re-
quireable under the agreements? Were the agreements transferable
by the purchasers without MGRM's consent? How was the contract
price set, and to what extent was it subject to negotiation? Were the
terms of the "blow-out" option ever varied or individually negotiated?
What were the terms of MGRM's put option, and had they ever been
varied?
2. The Marketing of the 45-Day Agreements
According to the CFTC's Order, between approximately Decem-
ber 1991 and December 1993, MGRM "marketed, offered and sold"
45-Day Agreements "to more than one hundred independent gasoline
stations and heating oil distributors throughout the United States."' 90
The CFTC does not tell us with how many purchasers MGRM had
open 45 Day Agreements at the end of this period.191
According to the CFTC, in early September 1993, MGRM de-
cided "to massively increase the size of its 'book' of petroleum prod-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Based on other information, it appears that as of September 30, 1993, MGRM had 100
open 45-Day Agreements. Between that date and March 31, 1994, MGRM had negotiated the
cancellation of approximately 70 of these agreements.
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uct contracts to customers."'192 During the second half of September
1993, MGRM sold enough contracts "to increase the size of its busi-
ness by nearly one-third. This increase was accomplished by adding
sales of 45-Day Agreements to many of its existing customers."'1 93 By
the end of September 1993, MGRM had "sold" energy supply con-
tracts of varying sorts, including 45-Day Agreements, "representing
the equivalent of approximately 160 million barrels of products to at
least several hundred customers."'194 We do not know how many of
these 160 million barrels were accounted for by the 45-Day Agree-
ments, or what proportion of the late September "sales" were 45-Day
Agreements.
From the CFTC's Order, we do know, however, that "virtually all
purchasers" of the 45-Day Agreements did so with the "intent of in-
voking the 'blow-out' provision for the purpose of speculating on the
price of the underlying product." 195 Furthermore, "[t]his speculative
intent was encouraged by MGR&M sales presentations," which em-
phasized (1) "the likelihood that prices would reach the exit level well
before the expiration of the contract term," and (2) that if prices did
not reach the exit level, "alternative arrangements could be made to
offset the contracts without delivery. ' 196 The CFTC provides no fur-
ther information about MGRM's sales presentations or what was
meant or intended by the alternative arrangements. The CFTC does
emphasize that "no deliveries of product were made pursuant to the
45-Day Agreements,"'197 although it does not provide any information
as to either the length of time remaining on the outstanding 45-Day
Agreements or how or whether MGRM had negotiated the termina-
tion of any of these agreements. 198
B. CFTC's Legal Analysis
The CFTC's legal analysis of the 45-Day agreements is a model of
conciseness, if not jurisdictional justification. The CFTC's entire legal
discussion is contained in the following sentence:
These contracts, therefore, contain all the essential elements of a
futures contract: they call for the making or taking of delivery of a
commodity in the future at a price or pricing formula established at









initiation; they may be satisfied either by delivery of the commodity
or by engaging in an offsetting transaction without delivery; the pur-
pose of the transaction is primarily to speculate or hedge the risk
price change in the commodity without actually acquiring the un-
derlying commodity. 199
The CFTC provides no discussion of precedent, no comparison of
the 45-Day Agreements with other legal or illegal OTC contracts, no
analysis of why the 45-Day Agreements do not fit within any of the
available exemptions, and no explanation of whether the 45-Day
Agreements might have avoided their regulatory fate if they had been
differently marketed-for example, if the contracts themselves had re-
mained the same but MGRM had made clear that "alternative ar-
rangements" for offset would not be available in the event commodity
prices never reached the exit level.
C. Defense and Criticism of the MGRM Order
1. CFTC: "Not a Policymaking Decision"
In responding to the criticisms and questions that have followed
the issuance of the MGRM Order, the CIFTC, for the most part, has
expressed surprise, given that the Order was entered by consent and
was fact-specific to the MGRM situation. As then-CFTC Chairperson
Mary L. Schapiro stated, the MGRM Order is "a settled action that
applies only to these parties .... ",200 One Commission spokesperson
went so far as to state that the action "did not carry the weight of a
policymaking decision. '"201
It is hard to know what to make of the CFTC's position. On the
one hand, if the CFFC's point is simply a jurisprudential one, that as a
matter of law, a consent order has no precedential force, 20 2 then the
agency is unquestionably correct but pointlessly so, for no one to my
knowledge has suggested, much less argued, the contrary.
On the other hand, if the CFTC's position is that the MGRM
Order-or any other consent order-ought not appropriately be read
as a reflection of the CFTC's interpretation of the statute it adminis-
ters and thus as an indication of CFTC policy, then the CFTC is most
certainly wrong. Consent orders, despite their contractual characteris-
199. Id.
200. Mary L. Schapiro, Letters to the Editor: A Prescription for Disaster, WALL ST. J., Aug.
25, 1995, at A9.
201. James C. Allen, News Analysis: Regulators Stepping on Toes in Moves on Derivatives
Risk, AM. BANKER, Aug. 25, 1995, at 20 (purporting to characterize the view of a Commission
spokesperson).
202. See generally SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1989).
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tics, draw their legitimacy solely from the CFTC's authority to pro-
ceed against a person203 who "is violating or has violated any of the
provisions of the [CEA] or of the rules, regulations, or orders of the
Commission thereunder. .... -204 Unless the CFTC has appropriately
found that there has been such a violation, the agency is not author-
ized to enter into a cease and desist order even by consent-notwith-
standing its desire to do so; its belief that such an order would serve
the public interest; and the respondent's willingness, for whatever rea-
son, to voluntarily enter the stock.
Therefore, whenever the CFTC enters a consent order, there nec-
essarily has been a policymaking decision. The CFTC should expect
and view as entirely appropriate the public scrutiny of that order in an
effort to define the CFTC's current legal perspective and priorities.
To the extent a consent order provides reasoned and convincing ac-
counts of the CFTC's legal analyses and conclusions, the public is af-
forded useful guidance in holding economic and commercial rivers
within the banks of understood legal norms. To the extent a consent
order provides only abbreviated, incomplete, and unexplicated analy-
ses and conclusions-as is the case in the MGRM Order-appropriate
commercial activity is constricted because of uncertainty, proposed
economic ventures are aborted because of legal apprehensions, and
far too many law review articles, such as this one, are written in an
effort to tease out of the CFTC's cryptic pronouncements the sem-
blance of a coherent regulatory policy.
With considerable understatement, Douglas E. Harris, Senior
Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, said
that the MGRM Order had "'injected an element of uncertainty' into
some derivatives contracts." 205 Such a comment from a fellow regula-
tor indicates just how far off the mark is the CFTC's characterization
of the MGRM Order as not a policymaking decision.
2. Miller and Culp: "Egregious Overreaching"
In what is now a well-known and much discussed editorial-page
article in the Wall Street Journal, Merton H. Miller and Christopher L.
Culp, two University of Chicago economists already deeply embroiled
in the debate over the wisdom and appropriateness of the strategy
203. This discussion is framed in terms of persons other than contract markets or other regis-
trants. The points made, however, are equally applicable with respect to other types of persons.
See C.E.A. § 6b-c, 7 U.S.C. § 8b-c (1994).
204. C.E.A. § 6c-d, 7 U.S.C. § 8c-d (1994).
205. Allen, supra note 201.
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employed to "hedge" MGRM's energy supply contracts,206 strode
boldly into the regulatory debate under the headline: Rein In The
CFTC.207
Miller and Culp's argument appears to proceed basically as fol-
lows. Futures contracts have "no specific economic attributes of their
own other than exchange trading to distinguish them from ordinary
forward contracts or swaps .... ",208 Any attempt, therefore, to estab-
lish an "objective definition" of futures contracts "not already ex-
change-traded is doomed from the start. '20 9 In the MGRM Order,
the CFTC sought to advance such a definition and chose for the pur-
pose an "extremely broad definition" of off-exchange futures. This
"broad definition" has "call[ed] into question the legality of numerous
financial transactions," and the use of this "broad definition" "far ex-
ceed[s] [the CFTC's] public mandate .... " and represents "egregious
overreaching" by an agency "seemingly more concerned with estab-
lishing turf than with the damage it may be doing to the markets." 210
As an initial matter, I confess to a good deal of sympathy with
Miller and Culp's "doomed from the start" claim about any attempt to
consistently and sensibly distinguish futures, which must be exchange
traded, from forwards, which need not be. This is a deeply radical
claim, however, directly at odds with a fundamental presupposition of
many years of rulemaking and enforcement actions under the CEA
and deserves to be dealt with on its terms. I address it below in Sec-
tion VI. At this point, I want to focus only on Miller and Culp's cri-
tique of the MGRM Order, and I have a great deal more trouble with
their argument as a whole than I do with their major premise.
Miller and Culp acknowledge that the CEA draws a distinction
between "futures" and "ordinary commercial forward contracts."
(They puzzlingly, unhistorically, and incorrectly attribute this distinc-
tion to a Congressional attempt to "limit[ ] the jurisdiction of the
206. See Christopher L. Culp & Merton H. Miller, Hedging a Flow of Commodity Deliveries
with Futures: Lessons from Metallgesellschaft, 1 DERIVATIVES Q. 7-15 (1994); Christopher L.
Culp & Merton H. Miller, Hedging in the Theory of Corporate Finance: A Reply to Our Critics, 8
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 121-127 (1995); Christopher L. Culp & Merton H. Miller, Metallgesell-
schaft and the Economics of Synthetic Storage, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 62-76 (1995); Franklin R.
Edwards & Michael S. Canter, The Collapse of Metallgesellschaft: Unhedgeable Risks, Poor
Hedging Strategy, or Just Bad Luck?, 8 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86-105 (1995); Antonio S. Mello &
John E. Parsons, Maturity Structure of a Hedge Matters: Lessons from the Metallgesellschaft De-
bacle, 8 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 106-120 (1995).






CFTC. 211) They also acknowledge that the term "futures contract" is
not explicitly defined in the CEA, and, while they do not make the
point directly, they would presumably also acknowledge that no ex-
plicit definition of "ordinary commercial forward contracts" is pro-
vided in the CEA either. As a result of this statutory, but undefined,
distinction between futures and forwards, Miller and Culp assert that
"[t]o lawyers, the seeming oxymoron of 'off-exchange futures' has
legal meaning .... ",212 But, why only "to lawyers"? If Miller and
Culp's argument is that the CEA should be interpreted by reading
"futures contract" to mean "contract traded on an exchange," they are
just plain wrong. Section 4(a) of the statute, the section at issue in the
MGRM Order, makes it illegal to effect "any transaction in" a futures
contract otherwise than on an exchange. If "futures contract" meant
"exchange traded contract," section 4(a), and a number of other sec-
tions of the CEA, would simply make no sense.
Yet if everyone, and not just the lawyers, must accept that there
can be such things as "off-exchange futures," then surely there must
be some way to identify them, or at least a responsible regulatory
agency charged with enforcing a statute that makes them illegal
should attempt to do so. This appears to be the crux of the Miller and
Culp argument. Because futures contracts lack "specific economic at-
tributes of their own," an "overzealous regulator fishing for 'illegal
off-exchange futures'.. . confronts a virtually unlimited supply of pos-
sibilities [for accomplishing the identification]. '213 in its overzealous-
ness, the CFTC chose an "extremely broad definition" to identify
"off-exchange futures." It did this not in response to its "public man-
date" but in an effort to "establish[ ] turf," thereby rendering "uncer-
tain the enforceability of an important class of commercial derivatives
transactions. 214
The problem with this argument is that it could be used against
virtually all of the classic, traditional definitions of "off-exchange fu-
tures," for it is difficult to draw from any of these formulations of the
211. The Futures Trading Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 187, distinguished "futures" and "ordinary
commercial forward contracts" in order to exclude private commercial transactions from the
taxing provisions of the Act. See 1977 Interpretation, supra note 19, at 21,911. However,
although the distinction has been included in all statutes regulating futures trading since the
enactment of the FTA, the CFTC was not created until the passage of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974. 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).





futures/forwards distinction 215 an objective, closed-ended definition of
a futures contract that would not "call[ ] into question the legality of
numerous financial transactions. ' 216 Miller and Culp are simply
wrong when they assert that the broad definition of futures contract in
the MGRM Order was put forward by the CFTC "[i]n almost total
disregard of its previous rulings and statements. '21 7 On this point,
Chairman Schapiro has the better argument when she states: "Despite
the expressed fears of some market observers, language in the
[MGRM] order shorthanding 'all the essential elements' of a futures
contract is not a departure from traditional legal/economic analysis or
case law."' 218 Indeed, the CFTC appears to have consciously modeled
its MGRM definition of "all the essential elements of a futures con-
tract" directly on a discussion in the Swaps Policy Statement of the
"common" and "necessary" elements of futures contracts. 219
The problem with the CFTC's "essential elements" is not their
pedigree or that they are in conflict with the CFTC's previous rulings
and statements. The problem is the ambiguity of the phrase itself and
the implication the phrase carries that the CFTC is seeking to freeze
the definition of a "futures contract" to establish a clear, objective,
immutable standard, without regard for the concept's historical and
needed future evolution as the commercial OTC market evolves.
215. See, e.g., In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941,
at 23,777 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
216. Miller & Culp, supra note 3, at A10.
217. Id.
218. Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at National Grain Trade Council Fall Meeting
(Sept. 15, 1995) (transcript available from the Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n Office of
Pub. Affairs).
219. The MGRM Order states:
[The 45-Day Agreements] contain all the essential elements of a futures contract: they
call for the making or taking of delivery of a commodity in the future at a price or
pricing formula established at initiation; they may be satisfied either by delivery of the
commodity or by engaging in an offsetting transaction without delivery; the purpose of
the transaction is primarily to speculate or hedge the risk of price change in the com-
modity without actually acquiring the underlying commodity.
MGRM Order, supra note 2. Compare this to the Swaps Policy Statement, which states:
Although there is no definitive list of the elements of futures contracts, the CFTC and
the courts recognize certain elements as common to such contracts. Futures contracts
are contracts for the purchase or sale of a commodity for delivery in the future at a
price that is established when the contract is initiated, with both parties to the transac-
tion obligated to fulfill the contract at the specified price. In addition, futures contracts
are undertaken principally to assume or shift price risk without transferring the under-
lying commodity. As a result, futures contracts providing for delivery may be satisfied
either by delivery or offset.
Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,694-695.
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D. The Problems with the MGRM Order
Certain of the problems with the MGRM Order-for example,
the inadequate description of the 45-Day Contract and the absence of
meaningful legal analysis of the reasons for the CFTC's findings-
have been previously discussed. In addition, the uncertainty the Or-
der has created about the continuing validity of various legal prece-
dents has been referred to on several occasions. This Section
specifically addresses how the MGRM Order creates that uncertainty
and highlights those areas that are of the greatest concern.
1. Are the 45-Day Agreements Futures Contracts by
their Own Terms?
The CFTC states that the 45-Day Agreements "contain all of the
essential elements of a futures contract. ' 220 This wording suggests
that these agreements, by their own terms, are futures contracts. But
the MGRM Order states that one of the "essential elements" of a
futures contract is that it may be satisfied by "an offsetting transaction
without delivery."' 221 The problem is that the 45-Day Agreements, by
their terms, may be satisfied by offset without the consent of the
counterparty only in limited and unpredictable circumstances, that is,
when near-term futures prices are above the contract price. By classi-
fying the 45-Day Agreements as futures contracts, is the CFTC sug-
gesting that, if a contract has a right of offset under any circumstances,
it contains the essential element of offset and cannot be a forward
contract? If this were so, it would turn the futures/forwards distinc-
tion topsy-turvy. This is the case because when a counterparty enters
into a contract, such as a 45-Day Agreement, for which the ability to
exercise a right of offset is uncertain, that counterparty (by the terms
of the contract) must necessarily "contemplate[ ] physical transfer of
the actual commodity. ' 222 That is, in such a circumstance, the intent,
capacity, and resources of the counterparty must be that of the
counterparty to a classic forward contract. Yet, the CFTC says noth-
ing that would shed any light on whether or how it analyzed this issue,
the status of contracts with partial or "sometimes" offset rights, or the
presence in the 45-Day Agreements of other contract provisions that
would expand the offset possibilities.
220. MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4.
221. Id.
222. CFrC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Further, because of the clear possibility (by the terms of the con-
tract) that a purchaser may be forced to take delivery, the absence of
any discussion by the CFTC of the applicability of the 1990 Interpreta-
tion is, at minimum, surprising. The CFTC's finding of a need for ex-
change-style offset in commercial contexts to invoke "futures
contract" jurisdiction would appear to precisely cover the 45-Day
Agreements (by their terms).
Of course, one can surmise that, despite the contractual provi-
sions of the 45-Day Agreements, the CFTC concluded that the 1990
Interpretation was not applicable because of the apparent availability,
at the inception of the contract and without "private negotiations," of
"alternative arrangements ... to offset. . . without delivery. ' 223 On
the other hand, one can surmise that the CFTC was taking MGRM's
misfortune as an opportunity to back away from the 1990 Interpreta-
tion or, at least, to limit its classification of commercial transactions
without exchange-style offset as forward contracts to the Brent mar-
ket. This latter view of the MGRM Order is strengthened by a recent
statement of the CFTC's general counsel that "the delivery feature is
the primary factor that distinguishes a forward from a futures con-
tract. ' 224 In the General Counsel's view, the MGRM situation in-
volved the sale of futures contracts because "'delivery was never
contemplated in the first instance.' ' 22 5 But, of course, for most 15-
Day Brent contracts delivery was never contemplated in the first in-
stance either. Without a discussion by the CFTC of the distinctions
between the 45-Day Agreements and the 15-Day Brent Contracts, it is
difficult to know what to conclude about why it found the 45-Day
Agreements to be futures contracts and whether the 1990 Interpreta-
tion has any continuing vitality apart from the Brent market.
2. Possible Exemptions from CFTC Jurisdiction
Prior to the 1990 Interpretation, a mantra in evaluating whether a
transaction constitutes a futures contract was that the transaction must
be assessed "'as a whole with a critical eye toward its underlying pur-
pose.' Such an assessment entails a review of the 'overall effect' of the
transaction as well as a determination as to 'what the parties in-
223. MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4.
224. Futures, Forwards Demarcation Needs Examining, CFTC Lawyer Says, 27 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1820 (Nov. 17, 1995).
225. Id. at 1820.
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tended.' ' 226 Based on the information in the MGRM Order, it ap-
pears that MGRM marketed the 45-Day Agreements as purely
speculative transactions, with no risk that the purchaser would ever
have to take delivery. In other words, as the CFTC characterizes the
transactions, it appears that the only substance to the 45-Day Agree-
ments was the blow-out option and a tacit understanding that the con-
tracts could be offset if the option was not exercised. Based on this
characterization, the 45-Day Agreements appear to fit easily within
the long series of cases holding that commodity investment vehicles in
which the parties never anticipate delivery are futures contracts. 227
Assuming this was the basis on which the CFTC found the 45-Day
Agreements to be futures contracts, 228 there remain a number of un-
answered questions about why these contracts did not fall within one
or another of the safe harbors or exemptions from CFTC jurisdiction.
Given the "blow-out" option and the fact that much of the eco-
nomic substance of the transactions came from these options, an obvi-
ous question is why the 45-Day Agreements were not viewed as
commodity options exempted from CFTC regulation by the Trade
Option Exemption. 229 A convincing characterization of the 45-Day
Agreements as commodity options would require information about
the economics of these agreements, but the CFTC tells us virtually
nothing about those economics. For example, in the event the blow-
out option could not be exercised, what would be the terms of the
"alternative arrangements" for offset? If MGRM would have permit-
ted purchasers to offset with no or little economic cost, then the 45-
Day Agreements would certainly look like commodity options. If the
purchasers fully bore downside risk, then these agreements, despite
their option elements, would look like ordinary forward contracts.
More facts and some CFTC discussion of the issue are needed.
226. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,694 (quoting CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg.
Group, Inc.,, 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982); CFTC v. Trinity Metals Exchange, No. 85-1482-CV-
W-3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 1986)).
227. See CFTC v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1995); NRT Metals, Inc.
v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous), Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Co Petro, 680
F.2d at 578; CFTC v. Commercial Petrolera Internacional S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 21,222, at 25,096 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Habas v. American Bd. of
Trade, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,500 (CFTC 1987).
228. One serious difficulty with viewing the 45-Day Agreements as investment vehicles is
their pricing. Why would MGRM "sell" what amounted to five or ten year American-style call
options for zero premium? Without more information about MGRM's economic motivation for
entering into the 45-Day Agreements, it is hard to be entirely comfortable with this
characterization.
229. See CFTC Rule 32.4, 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1996).
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As for the availability of the Trade Option Exemption-assuming
the economics of the 45-Day Agreements would support the con-
tracts' characterization as options-the critical issue appears to be the
manner in which the 45-Day Agreements were marketed. The Trade
Option Exemption is available for a commodity option offered by a
person that reasonably believes that he or she is offering the option
"to a producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant han-
dling" the commodity underlying the option.2 30 MGRM appears to
have satisfied this aspect of the exemption. However, the exemption
also depends upon the commercial offeree entering into the option
transaction "solely for purposes of its business as such. ' 231 The appar-
ent purpose of this requirement is to exclude the sale of options to
otherwise qualified persons that are interested in speculating in the
commodity rather than in its "business use." The obvious question, of
course, is whether the manner in which the 45-Day Agreements were
marketed caused the transactions to fail the "business use"
requirement.
Also not discussed in the MGRM Order, but possibly applicable
to the 45-Day Agreements, are the Swaps Policy Statement 232 and the
Swaps Exemption. 233 With some massaging, these agreements appear
to be capable of fitting into the swap category, either as commodity
swaps-an agreement to exchange payments "calculated by reference
to the price of a specified commodity, such as oil"234-or as commod-
ity options with a "similar structure" to other option-like swaps prod-
ucts. 235 Indeed, the 45-Day Agreements appear to be viewed by a
number of major swaps dealers as sufficiently swap-like to raise ques-
tions as to whether the CFTC was backing away from its view that
"most swap transactions . . . are not appropriately regulated as [fu-
tures contracts.] "236 Reacting to the MGRM Order, The Wall Street
Journal ran a lead editorial criticizing the order under the headline:
Swaps in Danger.237
But even if the 45-Day Agreements are or could be viewed as
swaps, there are serious questions as to whether they could be brought
under either the Policy Statement or the Swaps Exemption. For ex-
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63.
233. See CFrC Rule 35.2, 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1996).
234. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,695.
235. See CFrC Rule 35.1(b)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(1)(i).
236. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,694.
237. Swaps in Danger, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at A10.
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ample, were the 45-Day Agreements susceptible to individual negotia-
tion or were they standardized as to their material economic terms?
Did MGRM make individualized credit determinations with respect
to each purchaser? Did the purchasers' speculative intent conflict
with their undertaking the transactions in a manner consistent with
the "line of business" requirement? And were the purchasers eligible
swap participants?
The MGRM Order provides answers to none of these questions
although the Chairman of the CFTC has subsequently commented
that MGRM "did not analyze whether the gas station operators to
whom it sold its contract[s] were 'appropriate' participants in the
swaps markets. Nor did it seek to apply other applicable [swaps] crite-
ria."'238 The Chairman has also stated that the MGRM Order "has
nothing to do with ... swaps or the swaps exemption. '239 And the
CFTC's General Counsel has stated that the company "'did not claim
the swaps exemption.' ' 240 Obviously, therefore, the swap safe harbors
were not available to the 45-Day Agreements. It would be, however,
very useful for understanding the CFTC's jurisdictional perspective if
we knew why.
At least one other exemption worthy of CFTC comment is the
Energy Contract Exemption.241 This exemption is available to com-
mercial participants that have the capacity to make or take delivery of
specified energy products and that are also "appropriate persons," as
determined by an asset or net worth test.2 42 From the MGRM Order,
we do not know whether any of the purchasers of the 45-Day Agree-
ments were in fact appropriate persons. The more interesting issue
under the Energy Contract Exemption is that it is not available if
either party has a "right ... to effect a cash settlement of [its] obliga-
tions without the consent of the other party. '2 43 Certainly, the "alter-
native arrangements" for offset, as described by the CFTC, appear to
constitute such a right; but apart from this marketing representation
did the blow-out option, by its own terms, constitute such a right?
That is just one more of the legion of unanswered questions posed by
the MGRM Order.
238. Schapiro, supra note 200, at A9.
239. Schapiro, supra note 218.
240. Laurie Morse, Derivative Instruments: US Ruling on MG Puts Spotlight on Internal Con-
trols, FrN. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1995, at 23.
241. See Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286
(CFTC 1993).
242. See id. at 21,287.
243. Id. at 21,294.
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3. The Ambiguity of the Phrase "All the Essential Elements of a
Futures Contract"
The CFTC's list of "all of the essential elements of a futures con-
tract" is itself a source of considerable confusion and uncertainty. 244
What does this phrase mean? Does it mean that the three elements
the CFTC lists are: (1) "necessary conditions" for a contract to be a
futures contract, (2) "sufficient conditions" for a contract to be a fu-
tures contract, or (3) "necessary and sufficient conditions" for a con-
tract to be a futures contract? 245
It is difficult to answer that question for a number of reasons, not
the least of which is the ambiguity of the "elements" themselves. Take
the "offset" element, as an example. The MGRM Order states, with-
out any further explanation, that contracts contain this "essential ele-
ment" if "they may be satisfied .. .by engaging in an offsetting
transaction without delivery. '2 46 Does this mean that a contract con-
tains the "offset element" if, but only if, as the CFTC stated in the
1990 Interpretation, there is a right of offset provided for "by the
terms of the contracts as initially entered into. . . .,?247 Or does it
mean something broader, such as the traditional Offset Requirement,
that is, the availability of an "'opportunity' to offset and a tacit expec-
tation and common practice of offsetting"?2 48 Which of these inter-
pretations-the new "Right of Offset" or the old Offset
Requirement-characterizes the CFTC's views of the offset "ele-
ment" in the MGRM Order?
Let us assume that this offset "element" is a Right of Offset. This
assumption appears reasonable given the terms and currency of the
1990 Interpretation and the CFTC Chairman's recent statement that
the MGRM Order does not "signal a new Commission view toward
any of [its] other exemptions, exclusions and interpretations. '"2 49 But
the consequences of this assumption are very problematic, for it would
appear to mean the "essential elements" set out in the MGRM Order
244. See MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4.
245. "If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a
sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well. Thus steering well is a neces-
sary condition of driving well, but it is not sufficient, for one can steer well but drive badly for
other reasons." SIMON BLACKBURN, TIHE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF PmLOsOPHY 73 (1994).
246. MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis added).
247. 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 39,192.
248. Transnor (Berm.) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1492 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
249. Schapiro, Remarks at Fall Meeting, supra note 218.
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are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a contract to be a
futures contract.
For example, assume the CFTC were confronted with an off-ex-
change market in energy contracts that was identical in all respects but
one to the Brent 15-day market-that is, this market had active trad-
ing in contracts requiring the delivery of a product in the future at a
price established at the initiation of the contract; there was no "right"
of offset but contracts were "routinely settled" by means other than
delivery; and the primary purpose of trading was hedging, speculating,
and tax trading. The sole difference from the real Brent market was
that this market was not limited to commercial counterparties, but
regularly involved trading by and marketing to the general public.
Can there be any doubt that the CFTC would view this market-de-
spite lacking a Right of Offset-as an illegal off-exchange futures
market?
If so, then interpreting the offset "element" in the MGRM Order
as a Right of Offset means that there are obvious circumstances in
which the CFTC's catalogue of "all essential elements of a futures
contract" 25 0 does not contain the sufficient conditions for identifying
contracts that are futures contracts. Moreover, accepting the Right of
Offset interpretation means that the CFTC's "essential elements" are
not even necessary conditions for identifying all futures contracts,
since the assumed public Brent market does not have a Right of Off-
set, but it would still be an illegal off-exchange futures market.
The sensible response to these difficulties with interpreting the
offset "element" as a Right of Offset would be to reject the notion of a
Right of Offset as one of the "essential elements" of a futures con-
tract, view the MGRM Order as a clear backing away from the 1990
Interpretation, and accept the more traditional opportunity to offset
notion expressed in Co Petro and Transnor as the proper interpreta-
tion of the offset element in the CFTC's catalogue of "essential ele-
ments." But this shift does not solve the problem, for the CFTC's
"essential elements" are still not sufficient conditions for identifying a
futures contract. If they were, the real Brent oil market would be an
illegal off-exchange futures market, but the CFTC has told us-and
reemphasized the point in September of 1995-that this is not the
case.251 Furthermore, even if we use the opportunity to offset inter-
pretation, the CFTC's "essential elements" are not necessary condi-
250. MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4.
251. See Schapiro, Remarks at Fall Meeting, supra note 218.
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tions for a contract to be a futures contract, for if there were an
opportunity to offset in a public off-exchange market, the intent of the
participants is likely to be irrelevant for a finding that that market
involved illegal off-exchange futures.
This discussion began with an inquiry into the meaning of the
CFTC's catalogue of "all the essential elements of a futures contract."
The conclusion-after an analysis of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions and the Right of Offset and Delivery Requirement-is that we
simply do not know the meaning of the phrase "all the essential ele-
ments." And we do not know because the CFTC has interpreted the
offset "element" in such contradictory ways that the phrase can have
no certain meaning. Indeed, the very notion of a definite and unam-
biguous catalogue of "all the essential elements of a futures con-
tract ' 252 seems an impossible and undesirable objective.
V. THE REASONS FOR THE CFTC's RESORT TO AMBIGUITY
Three conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussions
of the BT Order and the MGRM Order. First, the CFTC is purpose-
fully avoiding an articulation of its current view as to why or why not
particular OTC risk shifting products are futures contracts or com-
modity options. Second, the CFTC's effort to avoid specifying the
scope of its own jurisdiction is motivated by an institutional commit-
ment to definitions of a futures contract and a commodity option that
are flexible, open-ended, and fundamentally ambiguous. Third, the
CFTC, in preserving that ambiguity, is willing to be both disingenuous
and intellectually dishonest because it needs the ambiguity to accom-
plish three, often conflicting, objectives: (1) the maintenance of its
ability to proceed against malefactors as it sees them; (2) the reassur-
ance of the OTC dealer community and its congressional supporters
that it will not disrupt the institutional off-exchange derivatives mar-
kets; and (3) the reassurance of the exchange community and its con-
gressional supporters that it is and will remain true to the classic
standards for distinguishing futures from forward contracts.
On the one hand, these are not particularly flattering conclusions
to reach about one of our principal market regulators. On the other
hand, given the judicial and administrative precedents concerning the
Delivery Requirement with which the CFTC must work, these conclu-
sions may be a good deal better than they might otherwise have been
252. MGRM Order, supra note 2, at 4.
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had the CFTC not been willing to commit itself to studied regulatory
ambiguity.
In a fascinating speech in February of 1995, Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairperson of the CFTC, stated that "[t]he creation of new classes of
OTC derivatives presented the CFTC with a regulatory dilemma. '253
One horn of the dilemma was that new OTC products "resembled
futures, both in design and in the economic functions they per-
formed. '254 The other horn was that these products "fulfilled a legiti-
mate economic need for legitimate market users. '255 The CFTC was
thus forced to "struggle[ ] to apply [the] inflexible [exchange trading]
requirement to innovative OTC financial products that the law's draft-
ers ... clearly never envisioned. '256 It chose, according to Chairper-
son Schapiro, a "pragmatic approach" that was designed "to allow
OTC products to trade within the existing regulatory framework. '257
Yet "court rulings ...conspired to keep OTC derivatives under a
cloud of legal uncertainty," and the CFTC, in order "to avoid dis-
rupting the new OTC derivatives markets," was forced to issue "ever
more tortured interpretations of the [CEA] .... ",258 Not until granted
plenary exemptive authority in 1992 was the CFTC able to solve this
"regulatory dilemma[ ].-259
It is not often that one hears regulators describe their interpreta-
tions of the statutes they administer as "tortured," although in this
case that description appears to be particularly apt. The only two
points of disagreement I have with Chairperson Schapiro are first, her
failure to acknowledge that the CFTC's own creation and promotion
of the Delivery Requirement are largely responsible for the very exist-
ence of the agency's regulatory dilemma and second, her unjustified
assumption that the grant of exemptive authority to the CFTC has
solved this regulatory dilemma. As the BT and MGRM Orders illus-
trate, the CFTC is still caught on the horns of the same dilemma.
253. Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks to the National Capital Chapter of the Na-
tional Association of Business Economists (Feb. 15, 1995) (transcript available from the Com-









VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL TO END THE CFTC's RESORT TO
JURISDICTIONAL AMBIGUITY
The CEA's requirement that futures contracts must trade on ex-
changes and the obvious, legitimate and valuable economic contribu-
tions made by the OTC derivatives markets pose a clear regulatory
dilemma for the CFTC. On the one hand, if the CFTC continues to
utilize notions such as "delivery," "offset," and "standardization" to
distinguish forward contracts from futures contracts, it calls into ques-
tion the legality of the products that trade in these markets. On the
other hand, if it relies, as it did in the 1990 Interpretation, 260 on no-
tions such as "exchange-style offset" to mark that distinction, it risks
leaving unregulated public speculative markets, such as those in A-
Mark, which raise the possibility for serious public abuse. In the pre-
ceding sections, I have argued that the CFTC has purposefully re-
sorted to ambiguity to extend its jurisdictional reach to avoid
confronting, much less resolving, this regulatory dilemma. It is as
though, in both the BT Order and the MGRM Order, the CFTC re-
fused to explicitly assert, much less to justify, its jurisdictional claims
for fear of landing on one horn or the other of this dilemma. But I
have also tried to suggest that the dilemma itself is in large part of the
CFTC's own creation. In what follows, I propose the outline of how
the CFTC might go about resolving, or better yet, making the di-
lemma, disappear entirely.
The starting point in this project is the Delivery Requirement.
Stovall, Co Petro, the 1978 Memorandum, and other "classic" cases
involve what may simply be a logical mistake. They start from the
obvious and clearly correct proposition that if the parties to a contract
for the sale of a commodity contemplate delivery, and delivery, in
fact, routinely occurs, then that contract is a forward contract, pe-
riod.261 But they appear to conclude from that proposition that if the
parties to such a contract do not contemplate delivery, then the con-
tract is not a forward contract and, therefore, is a futures contract.262
But the conclusion does not follow from the premise.263 My first pro-
posal, therefore, is to urge the CFrC to make clear by means of yet
another statutory interpretation that the Delivery Requirement does
indeed identify an important class of forward contracts, but that a con-
260. See 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86.
261. See, e.g., Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 577.
262. See, e.g., id.
263. If X then Y, does not entail if not X then not Y. For example, if A is pregnant, A is a
female does not entail if A is not pregnant, then A is not a female.
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tract's failure to satisfy the Delivery Requirement does not bear on
whether that contract is a futures contract. That is, the first part of my
proposal recommends that the CFTC reaffirm that a bona fide intent
to deliver conclusively establishes a contract as a forward contract but
that the absence of such a delivery intent neither conclusively estab-
lishes nor creates a presumption that the contract is a futures contract.
In the recent Division of Economic Analysis Statement of Policy in
Connection With the Unwinding of Certain Existing Contracts for the
Delivery of Grain and Statement of Guidance Regarding Certain Con-
tracting Practices (hereinafter the "Policy Statement Regarding Con-
tracts for the Delivery of Grain"), the Division states that "the failure
to deliver on an individual contract alone would not require the Divi-
sion to conclude that the contract did not qualify for the forward con-
tract exclusion. '' 264 But this statement is decidedly unhelpful since no
one, to my knowledge, would argue the contrary. The issue is intent,
not what in fact occurs.
The second part of my proposal addresses that set of contracts for
the sale of a commodity that are made by counterparties that do not
generally intend or expect to satisfy the contract by delivery, although
delivery may nevertheless occur based on the determination of one or
both parities. I will refer to such contracts as "Non-Delivery Con-
tracts." Certain Non-Delivery Contracts in some contexts, such as
plain vanilla swaps, are appropriately classified as forward contracts
or a series of forward contracts;265 other Non-Delivery Contracts in
other circumstances, such as those traded on futures exchanges, are
appropriately classified as futures contracts. The issue is the bases on
which the two types of Non-Delivery Contracts are to be
distinguished.
With due respect to the CFTC and the courts that have wrestled
with the futures/forwards distinction, I want to suggest that it is not
only unhelpful but, indeed, highly counterproductive to regulatory
certainty to make that distinction based on an assessment of the trans-
action "as a whole with a critical eye toward its underlying purpose.
Such an assessment entails a review of the 'overall effect' of the trans-
action as well as a determination of 'what the parties intended.' "266
264. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 96-42, [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 26,691, at 43,850 (May 15, 1996).
265. See CHARLES W. SMrrIHsON, ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 234-244, 366-368
(1995).
266. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,694 (quoting CFTC v. Trinity Metals Exch.,
No. 85-1482-CV-W-3, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 1986)).
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There may be some cases at the margin that require such an assess-
ment, but surely the OTC derivatives market is not at the margin of
the CFTC's jurisdictional concerns. Quite simply, it misses the point
to inquire into the "underlying purpose" of a Non-Delivery Con-
tract-so what if it is to hedge or speculate as in the Brent Market?-
or into its overall effect? We already know its objective is to shift risk
rather than to deliver product. Given our present jurisdictional con-
cerns, "underlying purpose" and "overall effect" are just not useful
standards.
Thus, the second part of my proposal is to recommend that the
CFTC reject those aspects of prior futures/forwards jurisprudence that
call for a "critical assessment of the transaction as a whole," and
refocus its attention on the obvious and defensible public policy objec-
tives underlying the futures/forwards distinction. Specifically, I pro-
pose that the CFTC distinguish Non-Delivery Contracts based on
whether: (1) they are (a) executed on a "board of trade" or (b) mar-
keted or sold to the general public, or (2) they are not so executed or
marketed. Those that fall within the first category are to be classified
as futures contracts; those within the second category are to be classi-
fied as forward contracts. Some of the wisest and most knowledgea-
ble members of the commodities bar reject even the possibility of
establishing fixed categories, such as those I am proposing, that would
function as a "Platonic model of a futures contract. '267 Nevertheless,
unless there are relatively mechanical tests for futures and forwards
contracts that can be applied in the main, as are the definitions of se-
curities, without policy debate or ambiguity, it will be impossible for
the derivatives market to develop its full potential.
Let us examine the two tests I am proposing for the identification
of Non-Delivery Contracts that should be classified as forward con-
tracts. The first of these tests is that the contracts not be executed on
a "board of trade." In making this proposal I am following the 1977
Interpretation, which looked to the nature of the market and its par-
ticipants to identify when Non-Delivery Contracts become futures
contracts. The 1977 Interpretation suggested that "when so-called for-
ward contracts are traded by a group of persons whose activities bring
them within the definition of a board of trade, the contracts may, as a
consequence, lose their essentially private nature and come within the
category of contracts for future delivery with which the [CEA] is pri-
267. Jerrold E. Salzman, Reform of the Commodity Exchange Act, in COMMODITIES FU-
TURES TRADING COMMISSION POLICIES AND PRACnCE-1996 241 (1995).
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marily concerned. ' 268 The question, of course, is how to determine
when a "group of persons" selling contracts for the future delivery of
a commodity come within the definition of a board of trade.
The CEA defines a "board of trade" as "any exchange or associa-
tion, whether incorporated or unincorporated, of persons who are en-
gaged in the business of buying or selling any commodity .... ,"269 And
if a board of trade is engaged in the business of buying or selling con-
tracts for the sale of commodities "for future delivery"-futures con-
tracts-it must register with the CFTC as a contract market.270
As an initial matter, the identification of a board of trade would
appear to be straightforward. For example, the Ninth Circuit held
that the definition of a "board of trade" is "clear on its face" and was
"broad enough to encompass Co Petro's activities [of extensively mar-
keting to the general public gasoline contracts at a fixed price with a
deposit based on a fixed percentage of the purchase price]. ' '271 Like-
wise, there appears to be no question but that the term "includes both
formally organized exchanges and informal associations of persons en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling commodities. '2 7 2
Nevertheless, there are many commentators that undoubtedly
would argue that the identification of a "board of trade" is anything
but a straight forward matter and that my proposal to shift the focus
for differentiating forward contracts and futures contracts from the
Delivery Requirement to the identification of a board of trade is to
jump from the frying pan into the fire. There are, at least, two bases
for such an argument and I shall respond briefly to each.
First, the meaning of the term "board of trade" has become hope-
lessly tangled in the controversy over the meaning of the so-called
Treasury Amendment.2 73 This provision of the CEA, added at the re-
268. 1977 Interpretation, supra note 19, at 21,911.
269. C.E.A. § la(1), U.S.C. § la(1).
270. C.E.A. §§ 4a, 5, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 7.
271. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, 680 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982).
272. CFTC v. Standard Forex, Inc., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
26,063, at 41,453 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1994).
273. C.E.A. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A)(ii), states:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transac-
tions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan
contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage
purchase commitments, unless such transaction involve the sale thereof for future de-
livery conducted on a board of trade.
See also CFTC v. Dunn, [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,429, at
42,879-80 (2d Cir. June 23, 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1846 (1996) (oral argument heard);
Saloman Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 974-75 (4th Cir. 1993); CFTC v. American Bd. of
Trade, Inc., 803 F.2d 1242, 1249 (2nd Cir. 1986).
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quest of the Department of the Treasury in 1974, exempts from the
statute "transactions in" certain specified instruments "unless such
transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on
a board of trade. ' 274 A broad reading of "board of trade" in this con-
text-that is, one that would encompass trading of the nature that oc-
curred in Co Petro-would render the Treasury Amendment
purposeless, for virtually no transaction would escape CFTC jurisdic-
tion.275 Thus, if the Treasury Amendment is to be given legislative
purpose, a narrow interpretation of the phrase "board of trade" is re-
quired, perhaps one that limits the concept to organized exchanges.
But this result also may be undesirable, for it would permit virtually
unlimited and unregulated public speculation in those commodities
subject to the Treasury Amendment, e.g., foreign exchange and gov-
ernment securities.
This is not the place for a full blown discussion of the Treasury
Amendment, much less to propose a resolution of its conflicting inter-
pretations. Suffice it to say, I believe there is a resolution and that
resolution is precisely along the lines of the 1977 Interpretation. Thus,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to me to be very close to
the mark when it read the "unless" clause of the Treasury Amend-
ment such that all "off-exchange transactions" in "foreign currency"
are exempted from the CEA except where the enterprise is used "as a
base for marketing off-exchange futures contracts to the general pub-
lic"' 276 or for transactions other than "individually-negotiated ...
transactions between sophisticated, large-scale . . . traders. '277
The second reason that some commentators might argue for re-
jecting the approach of the 1977 Interpretation is that there are no
statutory standards for identifying those market activities that would
bring an association of persons within the definition of a "board of
trade." In particular, the CEA does not differentiate between institu-
tional and noninstitutional transactions or between the general public
and sophisticated counterparties. The best response to that argument
is to point out that there is nothing in the statute, either, about a dif-
ferentiation between commercial and noncommercial transactions or
274. Id.
275. CFTC v. Frankwell Bullion Ltd., 904 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. Ca. 1995) ("If the
CFTC's broad interpretation of 'board of trade' were to prevail, i.e., that any organization en-
gaged in selling foreign currency futures was a 'board of trade,' this would render the Amend-
ment meaningless: Every organization would fall outside the scope of Amendment."), affd, 99
F.3d 299 (1996).
276. Saloman Forex, 8 F.3d at 978; see also American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d at 1249.
277. Saloman Forex, 8 F.3d at 978.
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anything that speaks in terms of an "intent to deliver." The entire
futures/forwards distinction has been built on one enormous gloss
placed upon the CEA by the CFrC in the 1978 Memorandum. The
approach was wrong in 1978 and is positively perverse now. The
CFTC is in large part responsible for the continued vitality of this ap-
proach; it can, however, put an end to this approach if it wants to, as
its half-hearted attempt to do so in the 1990 Interpretation makes
clear.
Everyone starts at the same place: The CEA is a terribly drafted
statute. The objective is to make the best of it. Further, it appears far
more fruitful to start the analysis of the futures/forwards distinction
with the notion that the "national public interest" is affected by
"[t]ransactions in [futures contracts] commonly conducted on boards
of trade" 278 than with the notion that regulation is required of all
contracts for futures delivery that do not satisfy the Delivery
Requirement.
How then should a "board of trade" be defined for purposes of
the two-part definition of forward contracts I am proposing? Much
work may need to be done here, but the basic concept is that so long
as transactions, in the Fourth Circuit's language, are "individually ne-
gotiated," there is no "board of trade." But what does "individually
negotiated" mean, given that transactions on all of the principal com-
modity exchanges are individually negotiated as to price? At a mini-
mum, it means that all material economic terms of the transactions
must, in fact, be open for negotiation-that is, there can be no dic-
tated terms or contract provisions that are "requirements" of the mar-
ket.279 In addition, the transactions cannot have been executed on
any "physical or electronic facility in which.., participants ... simul-
taneously have the ability to execute transactions and bind both par-
ties by accepting offers which are made by one [participant] and open
to all [participants in] the facility. '280 In other words, a contract
should be deemed not to have been effected on a "board of trade" so
278. C.E.A. § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
279. Compare this with the condition in the Swaps exemption which states the swap agree-
ment must not be part of a "fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their mate-
rial economic terms." CFTC Rule 35 (1993). The Commission stated:
[M]ost of the terms of exchange-traded futures contracts are set by the contract market,
while all of the terms of swap agreements are subject to negotiation .... Standardiza-
tion of terms that are not material economic terms, for example, definitions, represen-
tations and warranties ... as found in certain forms and master agreements published
by various associations, is not by itself violative of this requirement.
Final Rule on Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5590 (CFTC 1993).
280. Id. at 5591.
1996]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
long as all material economic terms are subject to individual negotia-
tion and the transaction does not occur through what the CFTC has
called a "multilateral transaction execution facility." 281
With respect to the second part of my proposed standard for clas-
sifying Non-Delivery Contracts as forward contracts-marketing to
the public-the CFFC needs first to drop its past insistence that for-
ward contracts must have "commercial" counterparties 282 and that
these counterparties must enter into transactions "in conjunction with
the parties' line of business. ' 283 These views appear to be corollaries
of the Delivery Requirement. As the CFTC noted in the 1990 Inter-
pretation, "forward contracts have been described as transactions en-
tered into for commercial purposes related to the business of a
producer, processor, fabricator, refiner or merchandiser who may wish
to purchase or sell a commodity for deferred shipment or delivery in
connection with the conduct of its business. '' 284 Thus, in seeking to
characterize the 15-day Brent Contracts-unquestionably Non-Deliv-
ery Contracts-as similar to traditional forward contracts, the CFTC
stated:
These [Brent market] transactions, which are entered into between
commercial counterparties in normal commercial channels, serve
the same commercial functions as did those forward contracts which
originally were the subject of the Section 2(a)(1) exclusion notwith-
standing the fact that, in specific cases and as separately agreed to
between the parties, the transactions may ultimately result in per-
formance through the payment of cash as an alternative to actual
physical transfer or delivery of the commodity. 285
The problem with the CFTC's "same commercial functions" ar-
gument is that it is simply not true. 15-Day Brent contracts do not
serve the same functions as do forwards contracts that anticipate de-
livery. As the District Court in Transnor pointed out, the "three ma-
jor motivations in Brent market activity [are] hedging, speculation and
tax spinning .... The 15-day Brent market [, therefore,] does not re-
motely resemble the commercial trading originally excepted from the
[CEA]. ''286 Indeed, the Brent market "is essentially a 'paper' market
for speculative or hedging purposes rather than one for physical trans-
281. Id.
282. See 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 13,191.
283. Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63, at 30,697.
284. 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 39,191; see also Regulation of Hybrid and Related
Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022, 47,026-027 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 34) (proposed
Dec. 11, 1987).
285. Statutory Interpretation, supra note 86, at 39,191.
286. Transor (Berm.) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1492 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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fer. '287 Furthermore, recent studies estimate that over half of all
transactions in the 15-day Brent contract are accounted for not by
commercial counterparties that produce, refine, or merchandise petro-
leum products, but by international trading firms such as Marubzwi
and Goldman Sachs.2 88
Given the factual inaccuracies in the 1990 Interpretation, it is
hard to gauge just how seriously the CFTC takes its references to
"commercial counterparties." For example, despite the actual nature
of the participants in the Brent market and their motivations, the
CFTC was prepared to describe the transactions in 45-day Brent con-
tracts as "commercial-to-commercial transactions. 2 89 But such usage
stretches the meaning of "commercial" to the point of vacuousness.
While the CFTC's 1993 exemptive order for energy products is ex-
pressed in terms that limit it generally to "commercial participants,"
this term is not defined.2 90 Nonetheless, all banks, broker-dealers, and
FCM's are viewed as commercial participants as are all other corpora-
tions and partnerships with one million dollars in net worth or five
million dollars in total assets; there is no requirement that such per-
sons' transactions in the covered energy products be in any way re-
lated to the production, refining, or marketing of such products.291 It
is hard to see, under these circumstances, what purpose is served by
the CFTC's reference to "commercial" transactions in this context ex-
cept to create a suggestive but highly ambiguous link to the Delivery
Requirement. 292
Of course, as should be apparent from the foregoing analysis of
the CFTC's brief in the A-Mark case and its MGRM Order, the CFTC
is prepared to ignore the "commercial counterparty" concept entirely
287. Id.
288. See Blanche Sas, The Legal Aspects of the 15-Day Brent Market (Part 1), 5 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 109, 116 (1987).
289. 1990 Interpretation, supra note 86, at 31,191. But see In re Bybee, where the Court held,
without explanation, that the 1990 Interpretation applies only to "transactions entered into for
commercial purposes related to the business of a producer, processor, fabricator, refiner or mer-
chandiser, who may wish to purchase or sell a commodity for deferred shipment or delivery in
connection with the conduct of its business." 945 F.2d 309, 314 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).
290. See Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,633 (April 20, 1993).
291. The energy products exemption exempts from regulation under the CEA transactions in
specified energy products entered into by "eligible, appropriate persons" who have a demonstra-
ble capacity or ability to make or take delivery and from which transactions risks relating to the
making or taking of delivery occur. See id.
292. It should be noted that in its brief in A-Mark, the CFTC never mentions the "commer-
cial" issue, but in Noble Metals it supported the District Court's judgment based on the fact that
the parties were not "commercial merchandisers." Bybee, 945 F.2d 309; CFTC v. Noble Metals
Int'l Inc., 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995).
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when it suits its purposes to do so. In its brief to the Ninth Circuit in
CFTC v. Noble Metals International, Inc. ,293 the CFTC effectively ig-
nored the District Court's holding that because the purchasers under a
so-called Forward Delivery Program ("FDP") were "members of the
general public" and not commercial merchandisers, the 1990 Interpre-
tation was inapplicable to them and, therefore, the contracts sold
under the FDP did not fall within the forward contract exclusion.294
Instead, the CFTC argued simply that because the customers involved
"never expected any physical delivery of metal under their contracts,"
the contracts were not forward contracts.2 95
The CFTC has demonstrated it cannot apply the commercial
counterparty requirement consistently. When the CFTC has applied
the requirement it has lacked content or purpose, and there is no rea-
son to believe that the CFTC actually uses the requirement in its own
deliberations, except perhaps as a fig leaf to cover the nakedness of its
jurisdictional claims. The commercial counterparty concept should be
discarded.
Assume that I have been persuasive, and that the CFTC and, of
course, the courts and private litigants, drop the "commercial" gloss
on the forward contract exclusion. What then is to be understood by
my proposal that Non-Delivery Contracts are forward contracts only
if they are not marketed or sold to the general public? At least three
approaches are available, and I have no strong preference among
them provided the CFTC chooses one and remains consistent. First,
in both the Swaps Policy Statement and the Swaps Exemption, the
CFTC identified the need for individualized credit determinations as a
highly determinative factor in assessing the need for jurisdictional
scrutiny.296 Requiring such credit determinations (and prohibiting
credit risk mutualization) might be an effective and unintrusive way in
which to make the distinction between the general public and those
that are appropriate OTC market participants.2 97
293. 67 F.3d 766.
294. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, CFTC v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir.
1995) (Nos. 93-16961, 93-17285, 93-17291, 93-17386).
295. Id. at 24. Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Noble Metals focuses exclusively
on the absence of an intent to deliver citing Co-Petro, Stovall, and Bybee but making no refer-
ences to the 1990 Interpretation or the commercial/general public distinction made therein. No-
ble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772-3.
296. See Swaps Policy Statement, supra note 63; Exemptions for Certain Swap Agreements,
58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5590 (1993) (adopting CFTC Rule 35).
297. There are many questions raised by this approach. For example, in selling options
otherwise then on margin, one hardly cares about the credit worthiness of the buyer. Fair
enough, but we are here only discussing the bases for making the distinction between forward
contracts and futures contracts and presumably in such circumstances there will always be credit
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Another possible approach, which might be used in connection
with the first, would be for the CFTC to establish minimum contract
size requirements for permissible forward market transactions. For
example, in the Brent market a 45-day contract has an approximate
market value of sixty million dollars. This is not a market for the faint
of heart, the credit impaired, or those who lack confidence in their
counterparties. I acknowledge that determining the minimum size for
all types of OTC Non-Delivery Contracts would be a formidable un-
dertaking, but it would be an objective undertaking, and would cer-
tainly contribute to "regulatory certainty."
A third approach would be for the CFTC to distinguish between
the general public and everyone else based on the concept of "appro-
priate persons" contained in the amendments the Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992 made to section 4(a) of the CEA. In 1992, the
CFTC was given authority, subject to certain broad public interest
standards, to exempt from any provision of the CEA transactions en-
tered into solely between appropriate persons. 298 I recognize that this
provision is not a gloss on the forward contract exclusion. Neverthe-
risk. More troubling, however, is the credit card analogy. How are we to deal with the fraudu-
lent operator that sells forward-like contracts to the general public without regard for individual-
ized credit determinations because he has established assured rates of profit given expected rates
of default? The simple answer is that anyone operating in this way is not making individualized
credit determinations.
298. C.E.A. § 4c(3), 7 U.S.C. § 4c(3), provides that the term "appropriate person" shall be
limited to the following:
(A) A bank or trust company (acting in an individual or fiduciary capacity).
(B) A savings association.
(C) An insurance company.
(D) An investment company subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.).
(E) A commodity pool formed or operated by a person subject to regulation under the
CEA.
(F) A corporation, partnership, proprietorship, organization, trust or other business
entity with a net worth exceeding $1,000,000 or total assets exceeding $5,000,000 or the
obligations of which under the agreement, contract or transaction are guaranteed or
otherwise supported by a letter of credit or keepwell, support or other agreement by
any such entity referred to in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (H), (I) or (K) of this
paragraph.
(G) An employee benefit plan with assets exceeding $1,000,000, or whose investment
decisions are made by a bank, trust company, insurance company, investment adviser
registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or a commodity trading advisor
subject to regulation under [the CEA].
(H) Any governmental entity (including the United States, any state, or any foreign
governments) or political subdivision thereof, or any multinational or supranational
entity or any instrumentality, agency, or department of any of the foregoing.
(I) A broker-dealer subject to regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) acting on its own behalf or on behalf of another appropriate
person.
(J) A futures commission merchant, floor broker, or floor trader subject to regulation
under [the CEA] acting on its own behalf or on behalf of another appropriate person.
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less, the CFTC might well, without in any way offending legislative
history or restricting its own legitimate authority, choose to interpret
the forward contract exclusion along lines that mirror those in the
CEA for "appropriate persons."
To summarize, my proposal for dealing with the futures/forwards
distinction and eliminating (much of) the CFTC's incentive to resort
to ambiguity in asserting its jurisdictional claims is as follows: Forward
contracts would be identified in a CFTC statutory interpretation as
those contracts, and only those contracts, either that involve the ex-
pectation and general occurrence of physical delivery or that were
neither executed on a contract market nor marketed or sold to the
general public. All other Non-Delivery Contracts would be identified
as futures contracts.
If this proposal had been the "law" in 1994 and 1995, how might
the CFTC have decided the BT and MGRM matters? As for the BT
matter, it would have been clear that no Appendix A transaction was
a futures contract. Although all of these transactions were Non-Deliv-
ery Contracts, none of them was executed on a board of trade or sold
to the general public. What would not have been clear was the legal
status of the various option-like transactions described in Appendix
A. In the BT Order, the CFTC did not address the circumstances
under which swaps with option-like elements are deemed to be com-
modity options, and has not done so subsequently. Perhaps another
article is needed to discuss and recommend how the CFTC should
proceed on this option issue. It may be, however, that if the CFTC is
no longer able to resort to ambiguity in distinguishing between for-
ward contracts and futures contracts, it will move on its own to articu-
late clearly the parameters of the commodity option concept.
As for the MGRM matter, we simply do not have enough infor-
mation about the 45-day Agreements to classify them under the pro-
posed standards one way or the other. Nevertheless, the existence of
these standards would have substantially shifted the nature of the in-
quiry that should have occurred. The fact that these agreements were
Non-Delivery Contracts would have been irrelevant to that inquiry, as
would have been the status of MGRM's counterparties as "commer-
cials." What would have been relevant, and presumably relatively
easy to answer, would have been whether all material aspects of the
(K) Such other persons that the Commission determines to be appropriate in light of




agreements were subject to negotiation and whether the counterpar-
ties-under whatever approach the CFTC were to adopt-should be
classified as members of the general public.
VII. CONCLUSION
The CFTC has, at least, arguable jurisdiction over much of the
OTC derivatives market. Yet in its judicial filings, consent orders, and
public statements, the CFTC has quite purposefully chosen not to
clarify the precise scope of that jurisdiction or to articulate the bases
on which that jurisdiction can be asserted. Instead, it has asserted ju-
risdiction through ambiguity (e.g., ambiguity as to Bybee's status as a
commercial, ambiguity as to the legal status of the derivative products
BT Securities sold to Gibson, and ambiguity as to why the 45-day con-
tracts MGRM sold were futures contracts).
I have argued that a principal motivation for the CFTC's resort to
ambiguity has been its inability to resolve the jurisdictional dilemma
created by the use of the Delivery Requirement as the touchstone for
distinguishing forward contracts from futures contracts. I have also
argued, however, that the use of the Delivery Requirement in this way
(or even its replacement by the Right of Offset standard in the 1990
Interpretation) is unjustified and inappropriate. What is called for is a
new paradigm of the futures/forwards distinction, and I have sug-
gested how the CFTC might go about articulating and justifying such a
paradigm. The question now is whether the CFTC will recognize the
jurisdictional trap in which it has been caught by the Delivery Re-
quirement and seek to extricate itself in a manner similar to that I
have proposed, or whether the CFTC will continue to respond with
purposeful ambiguity to jurisdictional temptations of the sort with
which it was presented in the BT and MGRM situations. Based on
the CFTC's recent actions and public statements, I find no basis for
being optimistic about the answer to this question. Although not in
the financial product area, the CFTC's recent Policy Statement Re-
garding Contracts for the Delivery of Grain is once again dishearten-
ing confirmation of the Agency's inability to define the scope of its
authority.299 In its statement, the Division made clear that it is not
taking "a position on the validity or legality of any individual con-
tract,"300 but at the same time suggested that individually negotiated
299. See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 96-42, [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 26,691, at 43,848 (May 15, 1996).
300. Id. at 43,851.
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contracts for delivery in the next crop year "is inconsistent with the
principle of prudent-risk reduction .... "301 Do these contracts thus
become futures contracts because of their imprudent nature? The
CFTC may be a better adviser on "prudent risk reduction" than it is as
a financial product regulator.
301. Id.
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